Things and kinds of things

Well, Simplicimus:
Things in nature can only exist as kinds of things:

What this proposition means is that any sense-observable entity or individual, animate or inanimate, man-made or naturally occurring, presents certain distinguishing characteristics to our senses and understandings, characteristics which it necessarily shares with other individuals. No individual can exist at all without sharing a set of necessary characteristics with other individuals, and together these individuals constitute a kind.

That is the meaning of the proposition, which I claim does not require an argument to be accepted, but only an inventory of our thoughts and perceptions, each individual conducting this inventory for him-or-herself.

The particular table I am seated at now presents certain properties which also belong to other individuals and group these individuals under the kind "table." Whatever a table may be, and even though the concept of a table has been determined by invention and convention, individuals must present to our senses and cognition certain characteristics in order for the sortal term "table" to be legitimately applied to them.

But a table is an "artifact," so it is neither necessary nor sensible to conduct an investigation to discover the properties that tables present in common. Humans have constructed the idea of a table, and the idea (Greek eidon) of a table exists more or less perfectly in the mind of the craftsman before he builds a table.

Artifacts are generally opposed to "natural kinds" in the philosophical tradition that traces its origins to Plato and Aristotle.

A philosophical "realist" about the sense-accessible world defends the position that naturally occurring things animate and inanimate have "natures" or "internal structures" which make them what they are independently of our human "conceptions" or "representations" of them. Thus a partial conception of a naturally occurring kind can be made more complete through empirical investigation, as scientists in the eighteenth century improved our concept of water by discovering its molecular structure.

A realist philosopher would argue that when a human being observes (for example) a flock of starlings, having previously observed blue jays, mockingbirds, and many similar animate beings, "flock" (indeed a constructed sortal) is not the only sortal he uses to organize or cognize his perception of starlings on this particular occasion. No, says the philosophical realist, he also groups them into the species starling and the genus bird: he perceives them as starlings and birds even if he is unacquainted with these terms. Furthermore, argues the realist, this sorting into genus and species is not only natural but inevitable. That is, it is necessary for us to group starlings that way because that is how they really exist, and our perceptual and cognitive apparatus must be adapted to perceive and conceive things as they really are; otherwise our perceptions and cognitions could not be accurate or true.

In recent years a body of evidence has been developed from psychological experiments on young children that human beings naturally group objects or entities in the way that philosophical realism would predict.

I hope you will not take offense if I admonish you that no English speaker has the capacity to use some English word as he chooses and thereby change the meaning of the word in a way that excludes a meaning which is present in the general culture of English speakers.

Thus you write: "I agree that things are either natural or man-made (or man-caused, as in planting an apple tree). However, as I'm using the term 'kinds' to mean man-made categories for organizing 'things,' there are no 'natural kinds' (as you put it). You'll have to clarify what you were saying before I can give much more of a response."

Here you seem to have made your argument depend on your privately determined definition of a common word, "kind," which leaves it a very implausible argument indeed. You cannot credibly assert that you will use the word "kind" to mean only man-made categories in order to conclude against centuries of tradition that there are no natural kinds.

With respect to the standard by which we can judge the truth of a proposition which has pretensions to self-evidence: general acceptance is good but not conclusive evidence, and experimental psychology (as I have said) now provides a somewhat stronger kind of generalization from experience that human beings cannot do otherwise than organize the world of the senses according to the natural categories of genera and species.

While even the evidence from experimental psychology is not conclusive in the sense of deductive certainty, that is not relevant to the sort of evidentiary appeal that I am making in our discussion. I am arguing that a supposed self-evident truth appeals to the reason of the individual rational being. When that individual says, I cannot conceive the falsehood of this proposition, he takes that as evidence that it cannot be false. That is, that individual rational being cannot conceive of any rational being conceiving that proposition to be false.

You, Simplicimus, are able to form the assertion, at the purely verbal level, that you could conceive every individual human being as a kind in his or her own right. I say as kindly as I know how that you are misunderstanding a feature of your own rationality. In fact you cannot conceive every individual human being as one of a kind; in fact you necessarily put any individual that you now call a human being into the species human being and you cannot do otherwise. But the evidence for this must be the conclusion you reach when you examine your own cognition.

Elenchus should always be the goal in a discussion like this (noble elenchus, not self-serving elenchus). An alcoholic who lives in a homeless camp outside of Sacramento and can no longer satisfy his addiction with any strong drink other than vanilla extract will always be an exaggerator, good Simplicimus. But I hope I know my place as a professing Christian; I have not tried to produce the desired elenchus by speaking to you in parables.

Your reasonable friend, Pseudo Dionysus

My dear Simplicimus:
When we are slandered, we answer kindly (I believe St. Paul said that). I did define "self-evident proposition," but perhaps you did not have ears to hear, in the words of Isaiah and your Lord and mine. I said it was a proposition which does not require an argument. Another definition is "a proposition whose truth is accepted as soon as its terms are understood." You do not complain that you do not understand the terms "exist," "nature," and "thing" in the proposition, "Whatever exists in nature must exist as a kind of thing." "Kind" is a troublemaker for you, and you claim that kind terms or sortals are constructions that we humans find useful for categorizing and organizing the world and in general making sense of what we encounter out there, presumably so we can make a better use of the world and meet our "seeming needs" (in Yeats's phrase) more efficiently. According to you, these kinds into which we place things are at bottom arbitrary, that is, devised for purposes we determine according to whatever standard we wish to adopt, purposes therefore which we could have determined far otherwise than in fact we did.

Now I submit, fellow Christian, that you do not believe that all or even most sortals are human constructions, arbitrary or otherwise. "Orchard," for instance, is a quite different sortal from "apple tree." Orchards and the term which identifies them are the product of human intervention in the course of nature. You cannot go to an orchard and investigate it to find out more about what makes it an orchard. You can, however, go to what you have already identified as an apple tree and investigate it and others of its kind and discover properties of apple trees and apples which you did not previously know existed. Why are you able to do this? Because apples and the trees they grow on are natural kinds, kinds with natures which are not completely known to us but which exist independently of our perceptions, understanding, and categorizations; and which an investigation can therefore reveal more about to us.

Other than Jesus, what has existed in nature (existed in the world of space and time accessible to the senses) which has not belonged to a kind, whether natural or artificial? I swum the Tiber in my mother's womb, but for yourself you need to answer this question. The fate of the Counter-Reformation hangs on your answer.

Simplicimus responds:

D, two procedural points (I address the substance in the post below on "Self-Evident Propositions?")

First, I did not intend to slander you: I did not see (still don't) where you'd previously defined the term "self-evident proposition". However, I certainly acknowledge that you provided a definition (two statements of it) in this post, so we now have something to start working with.

Second, it will be much easier for everyone who may wish to follow this discussion, if you'd put your posts into the "Self-Evident Propositions?" thread. I assume that you've been creating new posts because you do not want your points to get lost as comments below the fold. The way to get past that problem is to edit the existing thread of "Self-Evident Propositions?" You do that (once you've signed in, same as you did to make a new post) by clicking on the pencil (or crayon, or whatever "kind" of thing the icon is supposed to be) at the bottom of the post.

Unless you object, I propose to delete both of your most recent posts (as separate posts) because I have copied them for you into the thread "Self-Evident Propositions?" If you would find that objectionable, please let me know.

Regards,
Simplicimus

Good Simplicmus,
I was unable to follow your directions on my most recent post because I did not see a pencil at the bottom of your response.

Pseudo Dionysus

Natural Law: Self-Evident Propositions?

In the post on "Dogs vs. wolves," Dionysus writes: Please address the problem of axioms or self-evident propositions, Simplicimus. When you claim that it is arbitrary to privilege essential traits, it is as if you were claiming that there is no such thing as relevance. You must respond to my suggestions for beginning points if the dialogue is to go forward.

Simplicimus responds:

Dionysus, It's a pleasure to hear from you again.

In my response to your first post, on "A few more natural law concepts," I did not discuss the idea of self-evident propositions, because it did not appear to have been raised in your post. Since I do not want to ignore you or your arguments, let's start this as a new discussion on self-evident propositions. Some starting questions:

• Do they exist? And assuming (as I assume you will) that they do exist...
  
• Are they universal, or may be limited by culture?
  
• Are they eternal, or limited to circumstances and context?
  
• What criteria must be met to be a self-evident proposition?
  
• Anything else that you may wish to discuss about them.

While I'm open to being persuaded that there are self-evident propositions, the assertion that they exist is not self-evident. Before we can begin to consider whether such things exist in the real world, you'll need to define the term.

Then, we'll have to deal with the fact that what seems self-evident to one person is not self-evident to another. (Much, as the press likes to note, "One man's terrorist may be another man's freedom fighter.") You can claim that the guy who doesn't "get it" is lazy, uninformed, perhaps even "disordered," but you'll need to make that case.

To get to a specific example, it seems to me that, if there are any self-evident propositions, then the prohibition against murder would be the most likely candidate. But even there, you have significant differences of opinion cross-culturally and over time. To take a few examples:

• Some think that killing in war is justified, some not
• Some think that capital punishment is justified, some not
• Romans once thought that it was fine to kill unwanted infants by exposure
• Many cultures have engaged in human sacrifice

So, even in the presumably strongest candidate of homicide, there is not much universality to be found. You may well say that universality (or near-universality, allowing for some percentage of simpletons) is not required. This relates to the objection raised by Academicius in "Natural Law: What Is It?"

Academicious: I think it is a fallacy to think that the general opinion is relevant here. In this case, the burden on natural-law advocates is to make a valid argument for some version of natural law from plausible premises, which is a standard of justification which is independent of the feelings or opinions of any particular person, or of mankind in general.

If you'd care to define your term "self-evident propositions. and tell me what evidence or logic should demonstrate that they exist, then I'll be happy to get back to you.

Regards,
Simp

Dionysus replies:

Hello, Simplicimus. Here is candidate for a self-evident truth, or a truth anyway which does not require an argument but only needs to be contemplated to be acknowledged:

Things in nature can only exist as kinds of things.

Let me know whether you agree with this, and then I will expound on what may follow from this first principle of metaphysics, namely that "kinds" or "species" (the Greek eidon which Plato used for the concept of forms or ideas) possess or present properties without which they would not be the kinds or species that they are.

From there, Simplicimus, the road to Rome will be clear.

Simplicimus replies:

Greetings, Dionysus,

You have a curious style: first you criticize me for failing to respond to a point that you'd not yet raised, then when I do respond to it, you decline my invitation to define what you're talking about, and instead ask me your question above.

D, your approach has the feel of slyness. I'd guess that you were very good at sneaking your wine past the prefects into the Academy. (As my mama don' tol' me, "Beware of Greeks bearing splits!")

Since being cross-examined by a mysterious stranger is not without an element of interest, I'm willing to play along with your game, if only to see where the ride might take us (to mix metaphors). However, I do so in the expectation that, at some point, you will settle down and define what you mean by a self-evident proposition, and describe the criteria that would allow me to know one when I trip over it. After all, it's only when I understand what you mean that I can meaningfully discuss it. (Now that's a self-evident proposition, if there ever was one.) And if you ultimately are unwilling to define your terms, we probably should stop wasting these pixels.

So, on that basis, on to your axiom: "Things in nature can only exist as kinds of things."

Honestly, I have no very clear idea what that's supposed to mean. (Again, it would be so much more efficient if you'd define your terms and ask me to react to them.)

Giving it my best shot, I assume that you mean that if a thing exists, it must be part of a "kind" of similar things.

Off the top of my head, I think I have a quibble and a fundamental disagreement with that statement.

As to the quibble, a thing can exist that is not part of a kind, if it is sui generis. The incarnate Son of God would be one example. If a thing is unique, it does not need a "kind" to exist. (As I think about it, that may not be such a trivial point.)

And, I disagree with the statement at a more fundamental level. A "kind" is just a category, which is an abstraction that we humans impose on reality to simplify and organize it. We don't ordinarily think about that, since categories are so much a part of our culture that we take them for granted, like the fish doesn't notice the water.

But when you think about it, it's clear that the categories that we choose to impose are abstractions that we invent: the thing exists even before we invent a category for it. Before cavemen invented the ideas of family, herd, or flock, the things that they categorized in those terms nonetheless existed. So, it was not necessary for the "kind" of family, herd or flock to exist for the things to exist.

And, those abstractions are, at a basic level arbitrary: we select which attributes that we want to emphasize in sorting things into categories (or "kinds"). Different people will select different attributes for sorting. And cultures that do not value an attribute often will not have a "kind" for it, although other cultures do.

But the fundamental truth is that things exist, whether or not we choose to categorize them into "kinds."

Saying that categories that we choose to impose on reality are arbitrary (subjective) is not the same as saying that they are useless or irrelevant. It is very useful to organize reality into boxes: we humans could not function at a very high level without doing so. Reality has too many inputs on our sensory system not to categorize, so that we do not have to analyze similar things anew every time we confront them.

Far more important, lawyers could not practice without categories (or "kinds") to argue about. And if they couldn't practice, it would be extremely difficult to justify their bills. And lawyers not being able to bill would be "disordered."

So, we can recognize both the utility and the underlying subjectivity (ultimate arbitrariness) of the categories or kinds that we impose to help us make sense of the world. You might even say that "all nature is ordered to fit the categories that we've chosen."

In conclusion, categories/kinds are extremely helpful to us in ordering our sense inputs of the world, so we should not abandon them, even though they are inherently subjective. However, we also should be extremely careful about trying to make moral judgments based on those arbitrary categories.

Now, if you'd like to tell me what you understand your sentence to mean, maybe we can see if there is ground for agreement. Even more interesting, frankly, would be to know what you consider to be the "kind" that is called "self-evident propositions."

And, I've never been to Rome, so your showing me the way will be most welcome.

Categorically yours,
Simplicimus

Dionysus responds:

My dear Simplicimus:

When we are slandered, we answer kindly (I believe St. Paul said that). I did define "self-evident proposition," but perhaps you did not have ears to hear, in the words of Isaiah and your Lord and mine. I said it was a proposition which does not require an argument. Another definition is "a proposition whose truth is accepted as soon as its terms are understood." You do not complain that you do not understand the terms "exist," "nature," and "thing" in the proposition, "Whatever exists in nature must exist as a kind of thing." "Kind" is a troublemaker for you, and you claim that kind terms or sortals are constructions that we humans find useful for categorizing and organizing the world and in general making sense of what we encounter out there, presumably so we can make a better use of the world and meet our "seeming needs" (in Yeats's phrase) more efficiently. According to you, these kinds into which we place things are at bottom arbitrary, that is, devised for purposes we determine according to whatever standard we wish to adopt, purposes therefore which we could have determined far otherwise than in fact we did.

Now I submit, fellow Christian, that you do not believe that all or even most sortals are human constructions, arbitrary or otherwise. "Orchard," for instance, is a quite different sortal from "apple tree." Orchards and the term which identifies them are the product of human intervention in the course of nature. You cannot go to an orchard and investigate it to find out more about what makes it an orchard. You can, however, go to what you have already identified as an apple tree and investigate it and others of its kind and discover properties of apple trees and apples which you did not previously know existed. Why are you able to do this? Because apples and the trees they grow on are natural kinds, kinds with natures which are not completely known to us but which exist independently of our perceptions, understanding, and categorizations; and which an investigation can therefore reveal more about to us.

Other than Jesus, what has existed in nature (existed in the world of space and time accessible to the senses) which has not belonged to a kind, whether natural or artificial? I swum the Tiber in my mother's womb, but for yourself you need to answer this question. The fate of the Counter-Reformation hangs on your answer.

Simplicimus replies:

Dear D,

We may or may not be getting anywhere. We certainly are not getting there fast.

If you'd like to move this discussion along at a more reasonable rate, just tell me what you mean by your proposed axiom that "Things in nature can only exist as kinds of things." I will then tell you whether or not I agree with it.

Nonetheless, I'll try again to respond to your latest points, on the basis of what I think you mean.

On Terms:

You wrote, "You do not complain that you do not understand the terms "exist," "nature," and "thing" in the proposition". That is correct, to avoid what may be pointless pedantry, I did not raise any quibbles with those terms as I understand them. But there is no guarantee that I am understanding them as you do, so we aren't (or I'm not) sure whether we are even beginning to discuss the same things. To give just one example, I assume that the proposition's use of "thing" includes living beings; you may well not understand it that way. I don't know whether you do, or whether it makes any difference.

Keep in mind that, if you are going to pose a proposition, it's your job both to define and defend it.

On the Definition of "Self-evident Proposition":

I will be happy to work with your definition of a self-evident proposition (a "SEP"): a proposition which does not require an argument. Another definition is "a proposition whose truth is accepted as soon as its terms are understood."

Now, we can begin to explore whether such a rara avis exists in the real world, which is what I assume you were setting out to do with your proposition about things having to exist in kinds (of which more later).

Before we leave this definition though, I'd like to know whether we're dealing with inductino or deduction in a SEP. When you say "does not require an argument" and "is accepted" (the passive voice is not much liked), do you mean not required/is accepted automatically by nearly everyone (so that we can look to universal or near-universal acceptance as evidence of a SEP)? or that the SEP, as a deductive logical matter, does not require proof/is accepted (so that deduction is key and popular opinion is irrelevant)?

On Mixing Apples and Sortals:

D, I'm afraid you lost me in your paragraph on apple trees and apple orchards. I'll respond to what I think I understand you to be saying.

I agree that things are either natural or man-made (or man-caused, as in planting an apple tree). However, as I'm using the term "kinds" to mean man-made categories for organizing "things," there are no "natural kinds" (as you put it). You'll have to clarify what you were saying before I can give much more of a response.

BTW, thank you for the designatipon "fellow Christian" (I assume that it was complimentary), and I like the term "sortals." One could say that I'm saying that all sortals are mortal sortals.

On the Sui Generis:

You ask, "Other than Jesus, what has existed in nature (existed in the world of space and time accessible to the senses) which has not belonged to a kind, whether natural or artificial?"

First, as noted above, I interpret "kind" as a man made conceptual construction; it's the thing that makes up the kind that is either natural or artificial (by which I assume you mean man-made or man-caused).

Being the inventive creatures that we are, we always can conceptualize a "kind" to cover any thing (or group of things). We consider it pretty useless, so don't bother, to create a "kind" (category, set) for only one member, but we could do it. So there is no thing for which mankind could not create a "kind".

On the Fate of the Counter-Reformation:

You ended: "I swum the Tiber in my mother's womb, but for yourself you need to answer this question. The fate of the Counter-Reformation hangs on your answer."

Don't brag: you didn't swim, you crossed; your mother swam. And, for that matter, I don't believe that your mother swam it either. I think it's something you dreamed up in one of your Dionysian baccanals. Which makes one ask, D, are you a "kind" of exaggerator?

More substantively, oh my! If the fate of the Counter-Reformation hangs on the answer of a Protestant named Simplicimus, then the C-R is leaning on a slender reed indeed.

I look forward to hearing more from you, Dionysus. I know that we'll get along swimmingly.

Kindly yours,
Simplicimus

Dogs vs. wolves

Dogs and wolves are cross fertile (which has caused problems for the preservation of an endangered species of wolf in the Ethiopian highlands (13,000 feet) because loose dogs keep mating with the wolves). If there is an essential difference between dogs and wolves it is in the attribute of tameness. No dog who was not more tame than a wolf would be a dog. So the essential characteristic that dachshunds and Dobermans share is docibility. The color of a dog's fur, on the other hand, is an accidental trait, and even if an owner breeds dogs for a certain color, coat color is not an essential property of any dog--a change in coat color would not affect his "dogness."

Please address the problem of axioms or self-evident propositions, Simplicimus. When you claim that it is arbitrary to privilege essential traits, it is as if you were claiming that there is no such thing as relevance. You must respond to my suggestions for beginning points if the dialogue is to go forward.

A few more natural-law concepts

Dionysus writes:

None of the possible "purposes" of a dog listed by Simplicicus in his question about the arbitrariness of the concept of purpose, goal, end, or any other translation of the Greek telos is a candidate for an essential end of a dog. All the possible ends which are cited by Simplicicus are "accidental" ends of dogs based on their usefulness to the human species. The essential ends and "proper functioning" of a dog are determined by its form (or nature or internal structure) which distinguishes it from individuals of other species. Thus it is an end determined by dog nature that dogs are pack animals, or that they care for their young. It is an end not determined by dog nature that some dogs walk on their hind legs some of the time. But whether even this last end is arbitrary is open to question. I would like to suggest that the term "arbitrary" cannot have any place in discussions of ends or purposes. The concept of an end is inherently rational. This seems to be an axiom you are unwilling to accept, Simplicicus. Yet all the ends we can conceive are either set by nature, which makes them natural and therefore rational in the sense that laws of nature (where law includes the concept of rationality) must be followed by individual members of species if those individuals are to function properly (or flourish or achieve eudaimonia); or they are set by human beings, which makes them rational in the sense that the human being set the end for a reason. (Part of the view I am advocating here is that the term "good reason" is a redundancy, while the term "bad reason" is either figurative or contradictory. Thus the only ends which should be considered arbitrary are ends which go against the good as it is determined by the essential properties of species. This would mean that it is not an arbitrary end of human beings to breed dogs to herd sheep, nor is it an arbitrary end of dogs to herd sheep under the command of human beings: both of these ends and activities conform to the natures of both species.) If you wish to deny the claims of natural law, you must begin by defending the claim that we can interpret the natural world wholly without reference to ends. Whatever their protestations to the contrary, even the Darwinists cannot do this since they accept the axiom that life itself (or biological existence itself) seeks its own continuation, which is certainly the concept of an end.

Simplicimus replies:

Oh, Dionysus, you party animal, you!

Once again, I may not have been clear in discussing arbitrariness. (I may need the nine lives of a cat to reach clarity, while here we are stuck with dogs!)

On arbitrariness of purposes: I do not say that purposes are arbitrary, although anyone who's watched an 11-year-old boy carving wood is likely to conclude that arbitrary purposes are possible.

Rather, I am saying that it is arbitrary for a teleologist to assign "the essential purpose" of a thing or organism. Every thing and every organism has many attributes, and may have many purposes.

It is not that purposes are arbitrary (if I make a shovel, I've made it for a purpose), it's the designation by the teleologist (a third party) of an essential purpose that is arbitrary. Who are you (or I, or or Aristotle, or even the SPCA) to say what is the "essential purpose"?

Now, if all that you mean by "essential purpose" is that an organism is to be what it is, as described by its attributes, then that that is either a meaningless or a loaded use of the word "purpose".

To suggest that an organism is "meant" by nature to be what it is has no meaning at all, in which case you could better avoid the term "purpose" entirely and simply note that the creature has certain attributes.

On the other hand, if you mean by "essential purpose" that there was a creator whose will can be discerned from the attributes that he gave the creature, then that is a loaded use of the term purpose, and we'd need to deal with proof of the creator, as well as divination of his will.

And it still would be a conclusion that requires defense to go on from the established fact of a creator, to argue that the attributes given by the creator imply a purpose. Perhaps, like the divine clockmaker so popular in the 18th century, he just set the machinery in motion, with no purpose other than to sit back and watch the show. Or, arguably, he might (like the auto industry) have intentionally built the system to move toward obsolescence and decay, rather than to strive toward maximization of form.

I'm not saying that there cannot be a purpose. I'm saying that whatever "purpose" we may want to propose requires more than just the simple fact of attributes.

That's where the wheels come off the logical cart for teleology: in the end, it seems to me, the teleological discussion of "essential purpose" necessarily collapses into a mere description of attributes. As noted above, that's an extremely weak (or misleading) use of the term "purpose"; and it's an unsatisfactory one, since what the teleologist really wants to do is to go on from those attributes to make moral judgments about what that creature should (or should not) do.

On the purpose of "dogness":

Would you say that variations between species of dog-like creatures (dog, fox, wolf) lead to creatures having different essential purposes? What about intra-species variations, as among breeds of dogs (dachshund, doberman)? And what is the teleological conclusion from differences among individuals within a breed or species?

On "Purpose" in Darwinism: Darwinism (and I'll use it here interchangeably with evolutionary theory, though I'm sure that a specialist in the field would wince) offers two good examples of the problem of inferring a "purpose" from attributes.

First, I acknowledge Darwinism does observe that genes are chemically programmed to reproduce themselves, leading to behaviors in the organisms that (in general) promote that reproduction. That's an observation of fact, not a moral value or judgment. It's simply an observation of how genetic material has structured itself (or been structured -- we haven't got into that discussion). While I obviously cannot prove this, I very much doubt that most careful Darwinist scientists would use the word "purpose" in their description of that fact, if they thought it was going to be used to imply moral judgments.

Obviously, many Darwinists do in fact purport to make value/moral judgments (e.g., it's wrong to kill whales or other endangered species) -- they're only human (the Darwinists, not the whales). But they're not being consistent, in that they only complain about humans, not other organisms, doing the killing. Nature involves inter-species rivalries, even unto death. Indeed, evolution requires it.

Also, many of the value judgments that they make ("It's wrong to wear fur.") are based on values entirely outside of Darwinism. You need something more than the Darwinist observation that genes work to pass on their genetic information in order to be able to argue that there is a "purpose" to an organism that would allow you to make moral judgments.

Second, Darwinism famously entails evolution. By your standard, it appears that natural evolution would be an offense against nature, because an organism, instead of realizing its "purpose" of perfecting what it "is" instead is changing to become something new.

And I got through all that without a single pun about "dogma". There really is order in the universe!

Regards,
Simplicimus

Natural Law: On Sex

EDITOR'S NOTE: Warning! This topic will involve content not suitable for children. Much as we try to keep this blog a family-friendly environment, it is impossible to address the topic of natural law of sex without some fairly graphic discussions. Proceed at your own risk, and keep out of reach of children!

BACKGROUND: Scholasticus and Teleologus have told us that Natural Law theory, based on teleology, leads to the conclusion that a shockingly broad (okay, that was a loaded description) array of behaviors is an "offense against nature," and, as Scholasticus' puts it, "devalues what makes us human."

As the range of those teleologically-proscribed activities grew, they reached the point where the assembled rabble responded with a large raspberry, by which they meant (if a rabble can have a meaning), "I don't think so, Bub!" (or the Greco-Roman equivalent thereof).

In separate posts, we expect that Scholasticus will pursue a number of fascinating issues, such as unreasonably dangerous activities (you won't believe what he knows about AEA) and pornography (alas, no pictures).

On a slightly different track, Teleologus was kind enough to present an argument for what many in the rabble considered a remarkable conclusion of teleology, to wit: mutual masturbation by a hetero married couple, to orgasm, without pornography (henceforth, "Clean Marital Manipulation" or "CMM") is an offense against nature. The discussion picks up with his teleological proof.

Teleologus:

1. Sex is ordered toward procreation.
2. Marital masturbation (one hetero spouse for the other), even without pornography, is inconsistent with, and disrespectful to, the teleology of the complementary bodies of the spouses. (Here, "marital masturbation" meant not in the sense of mere foreplay, but in the sense that the husband ejaculates in such a way that the act counts as "masturbation.")
3. Hence, [CMM] is an offense against nature."
   

Simplicimus replies:

My dear friend, Teleologus,

You thought I was avoiding you, didn't you?

Thank you for laying out the teleological chain of reasoning regarding the unnaturalness of CMM.

It won't surprise you that that reasoning does not "do it" for me, so I'll lay out some preliminary thoughts. In order to be clear, I'll respond to your points 1 and 2 above separately.

Simplicimus on the assertion that "Sex is ordered toward procreation"

You seem to get an awful lot of mileage out of the phrase "ordered toward." I agree that sex often involves procreation, and if that were all you meant, we'd be in agreement. However, I also observe that sex involves pleasure, unity-building in the couple, and possibly other benefits (exercise?).

While contemplating your argument, I ran across a report of a recent study in Sweden, which concluded that good sex at home reduces stress at work. (Link: http://www.myfoxny.com/dpp/news/offbeat/dpgo_Study_Good_Sex_Helps_Job_Performance_mb_06062009_2547800) So, based on that study, one could claim that "sex is ordered to producing relaxed workers." (Why don't you stick that up your teleological pipe and smoke it!)

So, while I recognize the role of reproduction in sex, I do not privilege it over other benefits (or purposes) for engaging in sexual activity. Having sex for fun/pleasure is as legitimate as having sex to produce a baby.

The case of an infertile couple illustrates this quite vividly. Although they clearly are not having sex for procreation, their sex is no less "natural" or "right" than is the sex of a couple that can, or even wants to, conceive.

Furthermore, while I would not argue that a human life is a negative, I firmly believe that the decision to make a life can be unwise or "disordered" (if I used that term).

You're going to have to go beyond the mere assertion that "sex is ordered toward procreation" and show the reasoning on which you can claim that procreation has a higher standing than the other benefits/purposes of sex. (Even if your point is a "metaphysical judgment" rather than a "moral judgment," and I'm not clear as to the difference between them, it's a form of judgment or conclusion that must be explained and defended.) In doing so, I expect that you will refer to self-evident propositions, which is a topic that we should pursue further, but probably best under the separate post of that title, which is being pursued with great "essential purpose" by Dionysus.

Purposefully yours,
Simp

Duns Scotus joins the discussion:

Just so Simplicimus doesn’t feel too lonely . . .

I think that his question about the infertile couple is an important one, and just so it doesn’t get lost, I’ll raise it in a different way. If the possibility of procreation must be present for sex to have a unitive function, then should all women become celibate around age 50, after they stop ovulating? (Or should we say that openness to children is still present in some metaphysical sense?)

Given personal experience, having had a vasectomy many years ago, I’d have to partly agree with the proposition that the most loving, intimate sex, unitively speaking, takes place between a man and a woman when they are deliberately trying to conceive a child. On the other hand, I can’t believe that sex post-vasectomy ceased to have a unitive function in my marriage. That certainly is not my subjective impression.

Therefore, I’m forced to the conclusion, so far, that sex even with birth control, can have a unitive effect, though perhaps not the fullest.

Now, talk about an area of inquiry in which less precision can be expected, than say, geometry! (Perhaps the cradle Lutheran in me is a touch worried about legalism here.)

I don’t see yet, how the teachings of Moses and Jesus on these issues are present in the silent order of nature, once they are pointed out. I don’t even see where Moses or Jesus deal with the issue, but will hope for correction. Where does either set forth a proposition, directly or by inference, that unity in marriage is impossible when the procreative possibility is closed?

Duns Scotus

Simplicimus continues his response to Teleologus:

Teleologus,

As to the second point in your proof, that "[CMM] is inconsistent with, and disrespectful to, the teleology of the complementary bodies of the spouses."

This clearly requires defense rather than mere assertion of the claim. I don't at all see how this point 2 follows from point 1, nor how it is "self-evident".

Rather, I see plenty of complementarity: the wife has a hand, and the husband has something to put in it, and vice versa, to their mutual enjoyment and unity.

It seems to me that what you are saying is the equivalent of "the mouth is ordered to eating, so it is an offense against nature to use it for talking, smiling, or blowing bubbles." I don't get that conclusion at all, so please expand your assertion into an argument. (And what have you got against bubbles?)

Complementary yours,
Simplicimus


Duns Scotus re-enters the discussion:

Teleologus,

I'm behind on this, so I hope that this hasn't come up already.

I have some questions about the first premise, "Sex is ordered toward procreation."

My problem with it is not that I think it's wrong, exactly, but too simple. Why not take this as a major premise:

"Human sex is ordered to procreation and unity between husband and wife," with the
understanding that "and" includes "or"?

That doesn't seem unreasonable to me on the surface.

Natural law seems to be the only logical approach to ethics for Christians, but my difficulty is how to arrive at the main premises. Scholasticus points out, very persuasively, that conduct which empirically results in damage (gluttony, lust, etc.) would naturally be contrary to what God and nature have in mind. So I agree that auto-erotic asphyxiation is an example of unnatural conduct and that it sheds light on the discussion. I don't see how it is so obvious to establish that various forms of birth control are irrational. They may even be productive of good. Scholasticus has done a good job of presenting the negative argument on birth control, but if we get into a classic balancing analysis of its good and bad points, I don't think a clear cut answer appears.

So, to get back to major premises, induction from human experience doesn't get us in any
simple way to the premise that "Sex is ordered to procreation," which excludes other good
that might derive from sex and exclude some evils that might arise from procreation.

Finally, does reasoning about natural law come down to something like a utilitarian analysis?

Duns Scotus

Teleologus replies:

Simplicimus:

Thank you for faithfully recapitulating my argument for the wrongness of CCM. Please note that, as far as I remember, I never claimed that the second premise follows from the first or that either premise is "self evident." I claimed that the premises are true and that they support the conclusion, that the truth of the first premise is intelligible though not sense-perceptible, that one can understand that sex is ordered toward procreation.

You write that I "get a lot of mileage" out of the phrase "ordered toward." OK, feel free to substitute the word "for" for "ordered toward" anywhere you want and my meaning will not change much. Now you seem to get a lot of mileage out of conflating effects and purposes. You cite the possibility of sex-for-pleasure-and-exercise, citing the possibility of attaining those effects through sex, but not all effects are purposes, and subjectively intended “purpose” does not determine objective purpose.

If you are driving your car, you are (a) employing your car as a means of transportation and (b) consuming fuel. Consuming fuel is a constant effect of your driving, but it is hardly the purpose of driving. All vehicles use fuel, but the purpose of a vehicle is not to use fuel. That is something that must be understood rather than perceived through the senses because on the empirical level, effects are on all fours with each other; that one effect is the purpose over and above other effects is something intelligible.

Also, I can use my car (I can assign it a "purpose" that I determine subjectively) to hold down a pile of leaves, but that is not the purpose of my car or of any other vehicle (except for the GM Leaf-Holder-Downer).

How does this apply to sex? Even current human physiology textbooks, produced in this politically correct culture, still, presumably, refer to the human reproductive system as the "human reproductive system," which illustrates how teleology is inescapable, even for those who wish to vigorously reject it.

If we can establish that not all effects are purposes, then it seems to me that the pleasure of sex is an effect that promotes the purpose(s) of sex. That the effect is subservient to the purpose (think again of using fuel and transportation) is a relationship can be read in "the silences of Nature."

Again, those purposes should not be intentionally disconnected: If a man says that he wants to unify his body with his girlfriend's, but he doesn't want to become one in the child they might produce, and so uses a condom, he is saying something like, "I want to become one with you (beast-with-two-backs)," "but I don't want to become one with you (snot-nosed brat with your eyes and my bad teeth)." See the contradiction involved in intentionally trying to separate the two purposes?

My other friends, Duns Scotus and Erasmus have, like Simplicimus, expressed concerns that the view I have been defending would deny that sex could be used for its unitive purpose apart from its procreative purpose. Infertile couples and couples passed child-bearing age, then, would need to become celibate. Not so.

The key here is the difference between respecting the teleology of the male and female bodies, and "using" one another. A husband and wife in their sixties enjoying the marital embrace are doing nothing intentionally inconsistent with both purposes of sex--unitive and procreative--even though they almost certainly won't conceive a child. A man and woman in their twenties using artificial contraception likewise will almost certainly not conceive a child, but their embrace is intentionally limited: they are doing something to purposely block the purpose of what they are doing.

As for CMM, again, as I said before, I don't see how that fulfills either the procreative or the unitive purpose of sex, because it is ordered toward (or "for") neither procreation nor even union: the two persons are literally not uniting at all. CMM seems ordered toward pleasure, entertainment, recreation, and as such seems "ordered toward" hedonism and narcissism.

Simplicimus responds:

Dear Teleologus,

As you will have noticed, I moved your comment up to become an element of this post on the Natural Law of Sex, so that those following the discussion can see the chain in one place, without having to hop to the comments. It also remains in the Comment section, in case you'd particularly wanted it there.

Your most recent post has a lot of content, and a lot to be unpacked to make sure that I understand it, even before I try to react to it. So, I'll respond in tranches, roughly a paragraph at a time.

You wrote, "Please note that, as far as I remember, I never claimed that the second premise follows from the first or that either premise is "self evident." I claimed that the premises are true and that they support the conclusion, that the truth of the first premise is intelligible though not sense-perceptible, that one can understand that sex is ordered toward procreation."

On Premises and Arguments: If I understand the above, you are saying that the line of argument for your position on CMM consists of two premises and a conclusion. You're the expert on logic, so that may be okay, but shouldn't there be an argument in there somewhere? Do two premises really lead to a conclusion? I'm going to leave it to you to tell me whether that works. If I go in there, I might not come out: lost amid the circles within circles, as it were.

On "Intelligible though not Sense-perceptible": As you know, I've been stumbling through a discussion with Dionysus, regarding "self-evident propositions" ("SEP"). Dionysus seems to have taken the approach that an SEP is discovered by inductive reasoning (by it wouldn't be an SEP if it could be proven deductively), but it's not yet clear how that inductive process works to ensure that we have a valid, real-world SEP that can be relied upon for drawing moral (or other) conclusions. So, I've not yet got a good handle on what constitutes a SEP, or what tells me I've found one.

However, I'd assumed that all you teleolophiles rely on the SEP to cover those elements of your argument that can't be proven deductively, but which you somehow perceive are nonetheless true, as Dionysus does. Now, you come along and say "I never claimed that ... either premise is "self evident." I claimed that ... the truth of the first premise is intelligible though not sense-perceptible." (Shortening your statement to focus on the distinction that you seem to have made.)

You're really trying to confuse me! Your distinction between a SEP and a premise whose truth is "intelligible though not sense-perceptible" (for now, the "ITNSP" -- got a better acronym for that one, Bud?), now means that I have two concepts to understand. I will continue to pursue the SEP with Dionysus (and you're more than welcome to jump in there). What I need from you is an explanation of how I can know that something is true though its truth is not sense-perceptible. And, if you're feeling really charitable, I'd love for you to explain how that differs from an SEP.

To help kick off our discussion of the ITNSP, I fully accept that one can deal logically with things that are not sense-perceptible through deductive reasoning. For example, the number pi is a complete abstraction, not sense-perceptible in any sense of the term. Nonetheless, mathematicians can do proofs regarding properties of pi. But those are all deductive proofs.

I assume that you are not proposing to provide a deductive proof of the truth of your premises. If so, you would not need the whole ITNSP thing, you'd just lay out the deductive proof.

The only other logical approach that I'm aware of (I'm clearly not a philosopher) is induction. But induction is reasoning from experience, and experience necessarily involves our senses, so I cannot imagine how it could be possible to create an inductive argument to show the truth of the ITNSP, which by definition is not sense-perceptible.

Fortunately, we are not constrained by the limitations of my imagination, so I look forward to your explaining to me how you approach showing the truth of an ITNSP premise. Once I understand your approach to knowing ITNSPs, then we can discuss whether it works in general, and then whether it works specifically with respect to the two premises in your argument under discussion.

I think that that's all that I can do with the first paragraph, for now. I'll look forward to your response to the above, and I'll get back to you when I can on the second paragraph.

Thank you, Teleologus, for all the time you spend educating me. I'm grateful -- and glad that you don't charge by the hour!

Sensitively,
Simplicimus


Simplicimus continues his response to Teleologus:

You wrote: "You write that I "get a lot of mileage" out of the phrase "ordered toward." OK, feel free to substitute the word "for" for "ordered toward" anywhere you want and my meaning will not change much. Now you seem to get a lot of mileage out of conflating effects and purposes. You cite the possibility of sex-for-pleasure-and-exercise, citing the possibility of attaining those effects through sex, but not all effects are purposes, and subjectively intended “purpose” does not determine objective purpose."

On Effects and Purposes:

I am not sure that I'm getting mileage out of anything, but let's discuss "effects and purposes."

I assume that we both agree that there are certain identifiable attributes associated with a particular activity. To use the example of sex, we both should be able to acknowledge that the consequences include:

• reproduction (note that I list your favorite first -- you can thank me later)
• building unity in the couple (the favorite of my wife, Mrs. Simpi)
  
• enjoyment (my favorite -- I know, I'm a dog)
• exercise
• the one million other aspects that we haven't and probably don't need to identify

Now, here's where the rubber hits the road for teleology: what allows you to say that reproduction is a "purpose" and exercise is an "effect"? Similarly, reproduction over enjoyment or over building unity?

I think that the participants are free to choose the purpose(s) they prefer, from among all the attributes of an activity.

In fact, we are pretty clearly back in our discussion of arbitrariness (or subjectivity) of teleology: one man's "effect" is another's "purpose".

The characteristic Simplicimus view is quite simplistic: people can choose the attributes that they wish as the "purpose" of an activity in a particular situation. For an infertile couple, reproduction will never be their purpose of sex. Enjoyment, unity, exercise, or something else can be. For a fertile couple, it's also true that their purpose in sex may be something other than reproduction. And it is important to note that purpose is not fixed: for the same person or couple, different attributes may be selected as the purpose of the moment, from time to time. I am confident that you will agree that different couples will have different purposes for their sexual activity, and the same couple at different times also will have different purposes.

Who says that you teleologues (or Masters and Johnson, or Hugh Heffner, or Miss Manners, or anyone else) are in a position to tell these couples what should be "the" purpose for their sexual interaction? and in all times and all situations?

So, if the couples involved think that they have various motives, what is the analysis that allows you to say that there is one "right" or "fundamtenal" or "essential" purpose to sex, which somehow is not only more important than other purposes, but enables you to judge those other purposes? Inquiring minds want to know.

On an "Objective Purpose": You've now introduced a new term into our discussion, "obective purpose".

I've already said that I think that all purposes are subjective: the creator of a thing has one purpose, the user has one or many other purposes. There's no way to say who's purpose is "right" and whose "wrong"; it's all a question of whose perspective is relevant at the time. (Since we are not discussing theology, I'm leaving out the possibility of a divine purposes here.)

I suspect that you're going to tell me that "objective purpose" is what gives you standing to say what is the "right" or "fundamental" or "essential" purpose. If so, what designates a purpose to be an "objective purpose"? How do we know one when we see it? For example, I agree that reproduction often is "a" purpose of sex, but not always "a" purpose, and almost never "the" purpose, so what am I missing?

I also expect that you're going to tell me that an "objective purpose" is either (1) a self-evident proposition (or you would if you were Dionysus -- are you sure that he's not your evil twin brother? Are you two playing good-cop/bad-cop with my little mind?), or (2) an ITNSP (a truth that is "intelligible though not sense-perceptible").

I'm not seeing either the self-evidence or the ITNSP-ness of the assertion that the objective purpose of sex is reproduction. So, you'll need to explain to me the criteria that makes it such, or provide other examples of such truths, so that we can begin to deduce such criteria.

Please flesh out for me this concept of "objective purpose".

Purposefully yours,
Simplicimus

Natural Law: Is Teleology Inherently Arbitrary?

Simplicimus writes to Teleologus:

I share your desire for philosophy to embrace purposeful meaning of life, and often rebel against trends in modern thought.

However, isn't the loss of the idea of formal and final causes (which I think are very close, if not identical, at bottom) due to a modern recognition of arbitrariness?

At any rate, I don't see how one gets to an analysis of formal and final causes that is neither

(1) fundamentally arbitrary, nor

(2) reliant on some form of divine revelation. (We've had a similar discussion regarding ethics.)


How can one say non-arbitrarily that a dog is (or is not) for any of the following purposes?

• Companionship
• Herding sheep
• The meat dish at supper
• Medical research
• Something that we probably wouldn't think of in a thousand years

Do you see a way to square that circle?

Teleologus responds to Simplicimus:

In Aristotle, the purpose of an organism or object is found non-arbitrarily in what it is uniquely suited to do. When I teach this stuff in class, I start taking things from my briefcase and asking questions like, "Could this cell phone serve as a paperweight? It can? Well, then, is that it's purpose? No? Why not? Oh! Because it is much better used for something else, right? Could these scissors be used as a door stop? Etc."

Now what is a human being uniquely suited to do? Go swimming? Sleep in the sun? Copulate? We can do those things, but those activities are not uniquely human activities. Aristotle's answer, in a word, is think. So the purpose of human life is to think (rationally, as only humans can do, or as humans can do better than other animals that can also think). The next question is What makes something excellent? Short answer: that if fulfills its purpose well. So what makes a human an excellent human? To think well.

Thomas Aquinas gets hold of this stuff and modifies the purpose of human life to be to know and worship God, because that is what Thomas understands humans to be uniquely suited to do. What, then, is an excellent human being? One who knows and worships God well.

All this to say that there is at least a theory as to how final cause is non-arbitrary. I see the modern rejection of final cause to be based on empiricism, more so than on a recognition of arbitrariness. Final causes are not sense-perceptible in the way that material and efficient causes are. (Of course Hume famously argued that efficient causes aren't sense-perceptible either!)

Modernism and science get lots of credit from me for reducing human suffering (antibiotics! cancer surgery!) but often at the cost of removing the possibility of finding meaning in the suffering (and death) that remains part of human life.

Academicius also responds to Simplicimus:

I think that Aristotelian essentialism is a tricky notion. The reason it's tricky is because it is the concept of necessity-within-contingency. What I'm calling contingency is what you, Russ, are calling arbitrary. I know "arbitrary" and "contingent" don't have the same meaning, but in this context their meanings are similar enough that Aristotle's point goes through when you substitute "arbitrary" for "contingent." The existence of any particular thing or kind of thing is arbitrary in the sense that it it did not have to exist. This is true whether you think God created the universe or the universe as we know it evolved from some basic material constituents. God's good pleasure is not wholly arbitrary (because his will is entirely good), but there was no necessity that he should create anything. But to exist at all, at least in the material world or the world of the senses, is to exist as a kind of thing (a member of a species, if you will)--this basic metaphysical principle is implicit throughout Aristotle. So while the the existence of any particular tiger (for instance) is arbitrary in the sense that that tiger would not exist without its two particular parents (a condition which "contingent" captures better than "arbitrary"), it is necessary for it to be a tiger for it to exist at all, and that means that it is necessary for it to have the characteristics which make tigers tigers. So its "proper functioning" as a tiger is so far from being arbitrary that it could not exist at all if it did not function properly (or strive, even though unconsciously, to function properly) according to the tiger nature which determines it in existence. Its nature includes its formal cause and final cause, and its functioning in accordance with its nature is necessary in the essentialist sense of necessity--the strong metaphysical sense which makes it necessary for it to pursue the ends determined by its nature if it is to exist at all. Of course there can be arguments about what a tiger's nature or a human's nature is. But I think it's pretty implausible to argue that no ends belong to human beings just because they are human beings. For instance, taking nutrition is not arbitrarily assigned to our proper functioning. I think you can make a plausible argument that respecting the moral law is just as much a part of our proper functioning as taking nutrition, and even that loving God with a full heart and mind is just as much a part of our proper functioning, as that proper functioning is determined by our rational nature.

Simplicimus responds to Teleologus and Academicius:

I'm pretty sure that I'm talking about an arbitrariness problem, not contingency as Acad describes it. However, we'll know better as we go along.

In the course of a separate discussion on natural law and reproduction, Academicius wrote:

If belief in God is not already in place, you can make the same argument from reproduction by itself as a purpose of nature (a purpose recognized by Darwinists as well). The orientation to reproduction must be part of the human good because it is part of human nature, the human good as a rational good requires rational formation, which places constraints on the good of reproduction and requires its conscious direction toward the rational good, whatever that may be besides the orientation to reproduction. A couple not oriented by nature to reproduction because they are the same sex does not meet the essential first condition which orders themselves and their children or charges to the good of rational nature, whose pursuit under those conditions is therefore a priori disordered.

Simplicimus responded to Teleologus and Academicius:

Evidently, I'm enough of a modern that I don't even think I understand what Academicius means by the following: "you can make the same argument from reproduction by itself as a purpose of nature (a purpose recognized by Darwinists as well). The orientation to reproduction must be part of the human good because it is part of human nature..."

Nobody I know would argue that reproduction is not "a purpose of human nature" (to use your phrase: I'm still concerned that the term "purpose" (like "fideist") obscures more than it enlightens), or that reproduction is categorically not "part of the human good". Many of us would, of course, argue that, in certain circumstances, reproduction is not as good as birth control. While I respect the fact that Catholics are constrained by a doctrinal position on that point, I would defy anyone to show from natural law principles alone (independent of theology) that sex for reasons other than procreation is an offense against nature.

So, while I would never dispute that reproduction is a part of the sex experience, I do insist that it is not the totality, nor anywhere near the totality. As Erasmus noted ..., enjoyment also is a significant part, and bonding within the couple is a very significant part. There no doubt are other benefits that I'll think of later.

So, once again we encounter some of those arbitrariness objections to teleology:

1. who's place is it to say that reproduction is more important than pleasure, bonding, or other benefits, and
   
2. what proof is there that there is any definable moral "purpose" to an activity? (On that second question, we'd probably be much clearer by talking about costs and benefits rather than purposes.)

In order to make the teleological/natural law argument that I understand you both (and Scholasticus) to be making, you'd have to show that reproduction is of so much a higher order than those other benefits that it allows you to say that sexual conduct purely for pleasure, bonding, etc., is "disordered" -- or, as Scholasticus says, "dehumanizing." I don't see how you'll ever, in an objective sense, get to such a privileged status for reproduction. (Remember, I'm talking teleology and natural law here, not theology: one can do about just anything with claims to revelation.)

To me, a fundamental problem with teleology is the attempt to designate a primary purpose for things: many things have multiple purposes, and it's inherently subjective to say which is "primary". As I see it, when you argue that onanism is an offense against nature because that's not what the plumbing is "for," you also should say that the mouth is for eating, so it violates nature to use it for speaking, singing, whistling, kissing, blowing bubbles, or smiling.