Things and kinds of things

Well, Simplicimus:
Things in nature can only exist as kinds of things:

What this proposition means is that any sense-observable entity or individual, animate or inanimate, man-made or naturally occurring, presents certain distinguishing characteristics to our senses and understandings, characteristics which it necessarily shares with other individuals. No individual can exist at all without sharing a set of necessary characteristics with other individuals, and together these individuals constitute a kind.

That is the meaning of the proposition, which I claim does not require an argument to be accepted, but only an inventory of our thoughts and perceptions, each individual conducting this inventory for him-or-herself.

The particular table I am seated at now presents certain properties which also belong to other individuals and group these individuals under the kind "table." Whatever a table may be, and even though the concept of a table has been determined by invention and convention, individuals must present to our senses and cognition certain characteristics in order for the sortal term "table" to be legitimately applied to them.

But a table is an "artifact," so it is neither necessary nor sensible to conduct an investigation to discover the properties that tables present in common. Humans have constructed the idea of a table, and the idea (Greek eidon) of a table exists more or less perfectly in the mind of the craftsman before he builds a table.

Artifacts are generally opposed to "natural kinds" in the philosophical tradition that traces its origins to Plato and Aristotle.

A philosophical "realist" about the sense-accessible world defends the position that naturally occurring things animate and inanimate have "natures" or "internal structures" which make them what they are independently of our human "conceptions" or "representations" of them. Thus a partial conception of a naturally occurring kind can be made more complete through empirical investigation, as scientists in the eighteenth century improved our concept of water by discovering its molecular structure.

A realist philosopher would argue that when a human being observes (for example) a flock of starlings, having previously observed blue jays, mockingbirds, and many similar animate beings, "flock" (indeed a constructed sortal) is not the only sortal he uses to organize or cognize his perception of starlings on this particular occasion. No, says the philosophical realist, he also groups them into the species starling and the genus bird: he perceives them as starlings and birds even if he is unacquainted with these terms. Furthermore, argues the realist, this sorting into genus and species is not only natural but inevitable. That is, it is necessary for us to group starlings that way because that is how they really exist, and our perceptual and cognitive apparatus must be adapted to perceive and conceive things as they really are; otherwise our perceptions and cognitions could not be accurate or true.

In recent years a body of evidence has been developed from psychological experiments on young children that human beings naturally group objects or entities in the way that philosophical realism would predict.

I hope you will not take offense if I admonish you that no English speaker has the capacity to use some English word as he chooses and thereby change the meaning of the word in a way that excludes a meaning which is present in the general culture of English speakers.

Thus you write: "I agree that things are either natural or man-made (or man-caused, as in planting an apple tree). However, as I'm using the term 'kinds' to mean man-made categories for organizing 'things,' there are no 'natural kinds' (as you put it). You'll have to clarify what you were saying before I can give much more of a response."

Here you seem to have made your argument depend on your privately determined definition of a common word, "kind," which leaves it a very implausible argument indeed. You cannot credibly assert that you will use the word "kind" to mean only man-made categories in order to conclude against centuries of tradition that there are no natural kinds.

With respect to the standard by which we can judge the truth of a proposition which has pretensions to self-evidence: general acceptance is good but not conclusive evidence, and experimental psychology (as I have said) now provides a somewhat stronger kind of generalization from experience that human beings cannot do otherwise than organize the world of the senses according to the natural categories of genera and species.

While even the evidence from experimental psychology is not conclusive in the sense of deductive certainty, that is not relevant to the sort of evidentiary appeal that I am making in our discussion. I am arguing that a supposed self-evident truth appeals to the reason of the individual rational being. When that individual says, I cannot conceive the falsehood of this proposition, he takes that as evidence that it cannot be false. That is, that individual rational being cannot conceive of any rational being conceiving that proposition to be false.

You, Simplicimus, are able to form the assertion, at the purely verbal level, that you could conceive every individual human being as a kind in his or her own right. I say as kindly as I know how that you are misunderstanding a feature of your own rationality. In fact you cannot conceive every individual human being as one of a kind; in fact you necessarily put any individual that you now call a human being into the species human being and you cannot do otherwise. But the evidence for this must be the conclusion you reach when you examine your own cognition.

Elenchus should always be the goal in a discussion like this (noble elenchus, not self-serving elenchus). An alcoholic who lives in a homeless camp outside of Sacramento and can no longer satisfy his addiction with any strong drink other than vanilla extract will always be an exaggerator, good Simplicimus. But I hope I know my place as a professing Christian; I have not tried to produce the desired elenchus by speaking to you in parables.

Your reasonable friend, Pseudo Dionysus

Natural Law: Self-Evident Propositions?

In the post on "Dogs vs. wolves," Dionysus writes: Please address the problem of axioms or self-evident propositions, Simplicimus. When you claim that it is arbitrary to privilege essential traits, it is as if you were claiming that there is no such thing as relevance. You must respond to my suggestions for beginning points if the dialogue is to go forward.

Simplicimus responds:

Dionysus, It's a pleasure to hear from you again.

In my response to your first post, on "A few more natural law concepts," I did not discuss the idea of self-evident propositions, because it did not appear to have been raised in your post. Since I do not want to ignore you or your arguments, let's start this as a new discussion on self-evident propositions. Some starting questions:

• Do they exist? And assuming (as I assume you will) that they do exist...
  
• Are they universal, or may be limited by culture?
  
• Are they eternal, or limited to circumstances and context?
  
• What criteria must be met to be a self-evident proposition?
  
• Anything else that you may wish to discuss about them.

While I'm open to being persuaded that there are self-evident propositions, the assertion that they exist is not self-evident. Before we can begin to consider whether such things exist in the real world, you'll need to define the term.

Then, we'll have to deal with the fact that what seems self-evident to one person is not self-evident to another. (Much, as the press likes to note, "One man's terrorist may be another man's freedom fighter.") You can claim that the guy who doesn't "get it" is lazy, uninformed, perhaps even "disordered," but you'll need to make that case.

To get to a specific example, it seems to me that, if there are any self-evident propositions, then the prohibition against murder would be the most likely candidate. But even there, you have significant differences of opinion cross-culturally and over time. To take a few examples:

• Some think that killing in war is justified, some not
• Some think that capital punishment is justified, some not
• Romans once thought that it was fine to kill unwanted infants by exposure
• Many cultures have engaged in human sacrifice

So, even in the presumably strongest candidate of homicide, there is not much universality to be found. You may well say that universality (or near-universality, allowing for some percentage of simpletons) is not required. This relates to the objection raised by Academicius in "Natural Law: What Is It?"

Academicious: I think it is a fallacy to think that the general opinion is relevant here. In this case, the burden on natural-law advocates is to make a valid argument for some version of natural law from plausible premises, which is a standard of justification which is independent of the feelings or opinions of any particular person, or of mankind in general.

If you'd care to define your term "self-evident propositions. and tell me what evidence or logic should demonstrate that they exist, then I'll be happy to get back to you.

Regards,
Simp

Dionysus replies:

Hello, Simplicimus. Here is candidate for a self-evident truth, or a truth anyway which does not require an argument but only needs to be contemplated to be acknowledged:

Things in nature can only exist as kinds of things.

Let me know whether you agree with this, and then I will expound on what may follow from this first principle of metaphysics, namely that "kinds" or "species" (the Greek eidon which Plato used for the concept of forms or ideas) possess or present properties without which they would not be the kinds or species that they are.

From there, Simplicimus, the road to Rome will be clear.

Simplicimus replies:

Greetings, Dionysus,

You have a curious style: first you criticize me for failing to respond to a point that you'd not yet raised, then when I do respond to it, you decline my invitation to define what you're talking about, and instead ask me your question above.

D, your approach has the feel of slyness. I'd guess that you were very good at sneaking your wine past the prefects into the Academy. (As my mama don' tol' me, "Beware of Greeks bearing splits!")

Since being cross-examined by a mysterious stranger is not without an element of interest, I'm willing to play along with your game, if only to see where the ride might take us (to mix metaphors). However, I do so in the expectation that, at some point, you will settle down and define what you mean by a self-evident proposition, and describe the criteria that would allow me to know one when I trip over it. After all, it's only when I understand what you mean that I can meaningfully discuss it. (Now that's a self-evident proposition, if there ever was one.) And if you ultimately are unwilling to define your terms, we probably should stop wasting these pixels.

So, on that basis, on to your axiom: "Things in nature can only exist as kinds of things."

Honestly, I have no very clear idea what that's supposed to mean. (Again, it would be so much more efficient if you'd define your terms and ask me to react to them.)

Giving it my best shot, I assume that you mean that if a thing exists, it must be part of a "kind" of similar things.

Off the top of my head, I think I have a quibble and a fundamental disagreement with that statement.

As to the quibble, a thing can exist that is not part of a kind, if it is sui generis. The incarnate Son of God would be one example. If a thing is unique, it does not need a "kind" to exist. (As I think about it, that may not be such a trivial point.)

And, I disagree with the statement at a more fundamental level. A "kind" is just a category, which is an abstraction that we humans impose on reality to simplify and organize it. We don't ordinarily think about that, since categories are so much a part of our culture that we take them for granted, like the fish doesn't notice the water.

But when you think about it, it's clear that the categories that we choose to impose are abstractions that we invent: the thing exists even before we invent a category for it. Before cavemen invented the ideas of family, herd, or flock, the things that they categorized in those terms nonetheless existed. So, it was not necessary for the "kind" of family, herd or flock to exist for the things to exist.

And, those abstractions are, at a basic level arbitrary: we select which attributes that we want to emphasize in sorting things into categories (or "kinds"). Different people will select different attributes for sorting. And cultures that do not value an attribute often will not have a "kind" for it, although other cultures do.

But the fundamental truth is that things exist, whether or not we choose to categorize them into "kinds."

Saying that categories that we choose to impose on reality are arbitrary (subjective) is not the same as saying that they are useless or irrelevant. It is very useful to organize reality into boxes: we humans could not function at a very high level without doing so. Reality has too many inputs on our sensory system not to categorize, so that we do not have to analyze similar things anew every time we confront them.

Far more important, lawyers could not practice without categories (or "kinds") to argue about. And if they couldn't practice, it would be extremely difficult to justify their bills. And lawyers not being able to bill would be "disordered."

So, we can recognize both the utility and the underlying subjectivity (ultimate arbitrariness) of the categories or kinds that we impose to help us make sense of the world. You might even say that "all nature is ordered to fit the categories that we've chosen."

In conclusion, categories/kinds are extremely helpful to us in ordering our sense inputs of the world, so we should not abandon them, even though they are inherently subjective. However, we also should be extremely careful about trying to make moral judgments based on those arbitrary categories.

Now, if you'd like to tell me what you understand your sentence to mean, maybe we can see if there is ground for agreement. Even more interesting, frankly, would be to know what you consider to be the "kind" that is called "self-evident propositions."

And, I've never been to Rome, so your showing me the way will be most welcome.

Categorically yours,
Simplicimus

Dionysus responds:

My dear Simplicimus:

When we are slandered, we answer kindly (I believe St. Paul said that). I did define "self-evident proposition," but perhaps you did not have ears to hear, in the words of Isaiah and your Lord and mine. I said it was a proposition which does not require an argument. Another definition is "a proposition whose truth is accepted as soon as its terms are understood." You do not complain that you do not understand the terms "exist," "nature," and "thing" in the proposition, "Whatever exists in nature must exist as a kind of thing." "Kind" is a troublemaker for you, and you claim that kind terms or sortals are constructions that we humans find useful for categorizing and organizing the world and in general making sense of what we encounter out there, presumably so we can make a better use of the world and meet our "seeming needs" (in Yeats's phrase) more efficiently. According to you, these kinds into which we place things are at bottom arbitrary, that is, devised for purposes we determine according to whatever standard we wish to adopt, purposes therefore which we could have determined far otherwise than in fact we did.

Now I submit, fellow Christian, that you do not believe that all or even most sortals are human constructions, arbitrary or otherwise. "Orchard," for instance, is a quite different sortal from "apple tree." Orchards and the term which identifies them are the product of human intervention in the course of nature. You cannot go to an orchard and investigate it to find out more about what makes it an orchard. You can, however, go to what you have already identified as an apple tree and investigate it and others of its kind and discover properties of apple trees and apples which you did not previously know existed. Why are you able to do this? Because apples and the trees they grow on are natural kinds, kinds with natures which are not completely known to us but which exist independently of our perceptions, understanding, and categorizations; and which an investigation can therefore reveal more about to us.

Other than Jesus, what has existed in nature (existed in the world of space and time accessible to the senses) which has not belonged to a kind, whether natural or artificial? I swum the Tiber in my mother's womb, but for yourself you need to answer this question. The fate of the Counter-Reformation hangs on your answer.

Simplicimus replies:

Dear D,

We may or may not be getting anywhere. We certainly are not getting there fast.

If you'd like to move this discussion along at a more reasonable rate, just tell me what you mean by your proposed axiom that "Things in nature can only exist as kinds of things." I will then tell you whether or not I agree with it.

Nonetheless, I'll try again to respond to your latest points, on the basis of what I think you mean.

On Terms:

You wrote, "You do not complain that you do not understand the terms "exist," "nature," and "thing" in the proposition". That is correct, to avoid what may be pointless pedantry, I did not raise any quibbles with those terms as I understand them. But there is no guarantee that I am understanding them as you do, so we aren't (or I'm not) sure whether we are even beginning to discuss the same things. To give just one example, I assume that the proposition's use of "thing" includes living beings; you may well not understand it that way. I don't know whether you do, or whether it makes any difference.

Keep in mind that, if you are going to pose a proposition, it's your job both to define and defend it.

On the Definition of "Self-evident Proposition":

I will be happy to work with your definition of a self-evident proposition (a "SEP"): a proposition which does not require an argument. Another definition is "a proposition whose truth is accepted as soon as its terms are understood."

Now, we can begin to explore whether such a rara avis exists in the real world, which is what I assume you were setting out to do with your proposition about things having to exist in kinds (of which more later).

Before we leave this definition though, I'd like to know whether we're dealing with inductino or deduction in a SEP. When you say "does not require an argument" and "is accepted" (the passive voice is not much liked), do you mean not required/is accepted automatically by nearly everyone (so that we can look to universal or near-universal acceptance as evidence of a SEP)? or that the SEP, as a deductive logical matter, does not require proof/is accepted (so that deduction is key and popular opinion is irrelevant)?

On Mixing Apples and Sortals:

D, I'm afraid you lost me in your paragraph on apple trees and apple orchards. I'll respond to what I think I understand you to be saying.

I agree that things are either natural or man-made (or man-caused, as in planting an apple tree). However, as I'm using the term "kinds" to mean man-made categories for organizing "things," there are no "natural kinds" (as you put it). You'll have to clarify what you were saying before I can give much more of a response.

BTW, thank you for the designatipon "fellow Christian" (I assume that it was complimentary), and I like the term "sortals." One could say that I'm saying that all sortals are mortal sortals.

On the Sui Generis:

You ask, "Other than Jesus, what has existed in nature (existed in the world of space and time accessible to the senses) which has not belonged to a kind, whether natural or artificial?"

First, as noted above, I interpret "kind" as a man made conceptual construction; it's the thing that makes up the kind that is either natural or artificial (by which I assume you mean man-made or man-caused).

Being the inventive creatures that we are, we always can conceptualize a "kind" to cover any thing (or group of things). We consider it pretty useless, so don't bother, to create a "kind" (category, set) for only one member, but we could do it. So there is no thing for which mankind could not create a "kind".

On the Fate of the Counter-Reformation:

You ended: "I swum the Tiber in my mother's womb, but for yourself you need to answer this question. The fate of the Counter-Reformation hangs on your answer."

Don't brag: you didn't swim, you crossed; your mother swam. And, for that matter, I don't believe that your mother swam it either. I think it's something you dreamed up in one of your Dionysian baccanals. Which makes one ask, D, are you a "kind" of exaggerator?

More substantively, oh my! If the fate of the Counter-Reformation hangs on the answer of a Protestant named Simplicimus, then the C-R is leaning on a slender reed indeed.

I look forward to hearing more from you, Dionysus. I know that we'll get along swimmingly.

Kindly yours,
Simplicimus