Things and kinds of things

Well, Simplicimus:
Things in nature can only exist as kinds of things:

What this proposition means is that any sense-observable entity or individual, animate or inanimate, man-made or naturally occurring, presents certain distinguishing characteristics to our senses and understandings, characteristics which it necessarily shares with other individuals. No individual can exist at all without sharing a set of necessary characteristics with other individuals, and together these individuals constitute a kind.

That is the meaning of the proposition, which I claim does not require an argument to be accepted, but only an inventory of our thoughts and perceptions, each individual conducting this inventory for him-or-herself.

The particular table I am seated at now presents certain properties which also belong to other individuals and group these individuals under the kind "table." Whatever a table may be, and even though the concept of a table has been determined by invention and convention, individuals must present to our senses and cognition certain characteristics in order for the sortal term "table" to be legitimately applied to them.

But a table is an "artifact," so it is neither necessary nor sensible to conduct an investigation to discover the properties that tables present in common. Humans have constructed the idea of a table, and the idea (Greek eidon) of a table exists more or less perfectly in the mind of the craftsman before he builds a table.

Artifacts are generally opposed to "natural kinds" in the philosophical tradition that traces its origins to Plato and Aristotle.

A philosophical "realist" about the sense-accessible world defends the position that naturally occurring things animate and inanimate have "natures" or "internal structures" which make them what they are independently of our human "conceptions" or "representations" of them. Thus a partial conception of a naturally occurring kind can be made more complete through empirical investigation, as scientists in the eighteenth century improved our concept of water by discovering its molecular structure.

A realist philosopher would argue that when a human being observes (for example) a flock of starlings, having previously observed blue jays, mockingbirds, and many similar animate beings, "flock" (indeed a constructed sortal) is not the only sortal he uses to organize or cognize his perception of starlings on this particular occasion. No, says the philosophical realist, he also groups them into the species starling and the genus bird: he perceives them as starlings and birds even if he is unacquainted with these terms. Furthermore, argues the realist, this sorting into genus and species is not only natural but inevitable. That is, it is necessary for us to group starlings that way because that is how they really exist, and our perceptual and cognitive apparatus must be adapted to perceive and conceive things as they really are; otherwise our perceptions and cognitions could not be accurate or true.

In recent years a body of evidence has been developed from psychological experiments on young children that human beings naturally group objects or entities in the way that philosophical realism would predict.

I hope you will not take offense if I admonish you that no English speaker has the capacity to use some English word as he chooses and thereby change the meaning of the word in a way that excludes a meaning which is present in the general culture of English speakers.

Thus you write: "I agree that things are either natural or man-made (or man-caused, as in planting an apple tree). However, as I'm using the term 'kinds' to mean man-made categories for organizing 'things,' there are no 'natural kinds' (as you put it). You'll have to clarify what you were saying before I can give much more of a response."

Here you seem to have made your argument depend on your privately determined definition of a common word, "kind," which leaves it a very implausible argument indeed. You cannot credibly assert that you will use the word "kind" to mean only man-made categories in order to conclude against centuries of tradition that there are no natural kinds.

With respect to the standard by which we can judge the truth of a proposition which has pretensions to self-evidence: general acceptance is good but not conclusive evidence, and experimental psychology (as I have said) now provides a somewhat stronger kind of generalization from experience that human beings cannot do otherwise than organize the world of the senses according to the natural categories of genera and species.

While even the evidence from experimental psychology is not conclusive in the sense of deductive certainty, that is not relevant to the sort of evidentiary appeal that I am making in our discussion. I am arguing that a supposed self-evident truth appeals to the reason of the individual rational being. When that individual says, I cannot conceive the falsehood of this proposition, he takes that as evidence that it cannot be false. That is, that individual rational being cannot conceive of any rational being conceiving that proposition to be false.

You, Simplicimus, are able to form the assertion, at the purely verbal level, that you could conceive every individual human being as a kind in his or her own right. I say as kindly as I know how that you are misunderstanding a feature of your own rationality. In fact you cannot conceive every individual human being as one of a kind; in fact you necessarily put any individual that you now call a human being into the species human being and you cannot do otherwise. But the evidence for this must be the conclusion you reach when you examine your own cognition.

Elenchus should always be the goal in a discussion like this (noble elenchus, not self-serving elenchus). An alcoholic who lives in a homeless camp outside of Sacramento and can no longer satisfy his addiction with any strong drink other than vanilla extract will always be an exaggerator, good Simplicimus. But I hope I know my place as a professing Christian; I have not tried to produce the desired elenchus by speaking to you in parables.

Your reasonable friend, Pseudo Dionysus

My dear Simplicimus:
When we are slandered, we answer kindly (I believe St. Paul said that). I did define "self-evident proposition," but perhaps you did not have ears to hear, in the words of Isaiah and your Lord and mine. I said it was a proposition which does not require an argument. Another definition is "a proposition whose truth is accepted as soon as its terms are understood." You do not complain that you do not understand the terms "exist," "nature," and "thing" in the proposition, "Whatever exists in nature must exist as a kind of thing." "Kind" is a troublemaker for you, and you claim that kind terms or sortals are constructions that we humans find useful for categorizing and organizing the world and in general making sense of what we encounter out there, presumably so we can make a better use of the world and meet our "seeming needs" (in Yeats's phrase) more efficiently. According to you, these kinds into which we place things are at bottom arbitrary, that is, devised for purposes we determine according to whatever standard we wish to adopt, purposes therefore which we could have determined far otherwise than in fact we did.

Now I submit, fellow Christian, that you do not believe that all or even most sortals are human constructions, arbitrary or otherwise. "Orchard," for instance, is a quite different sortal from "apple tree." Orchards and the term which identifies them are the product of human intervention in the course of nature. You cannot go to an orchard and investigate it to find out more about what makes it an orchard. You can, however, go to what you have already identified as an apple tree and investigate it and others of its kind and discover properties of apple trees and apples which you did not previously know existed. Why are you able to do this? Because apples and the trees they grow on are natural kinds, kinds with natures which are not completely known to us but which exist independently of our perceptions, understanding, and categorizations; and which an investigation can therefore reveal more about to us.

Other than Jesus, what has existed in nature (existed in the world of space and time accessible to the senses) which has not belonged to a kind, whether natural or artificial? I swum the Tiber in my mother's womb, but for yourself you need to answer this question. The fate of the Counter-Reformation hangs on your answer.

Simplicimus responds:

D, two procedural points (I address the substance in the post below on "Self-Evident Propositions?")

First, I did not intend to slander you: I did not see (still don't) where you'd previously defined the term "self-evident proposition". However, I certainly acknowledge that you provided a definition (two statements of it) in this post, so we now have something to start working with.

Second, it will be much easier for everyone who may wish to follow this discussion, if you'd put your posts into the "Self-Evident Propositions?" thread. I assume that you've been creating new posts because you do not want your points to get lost as comments below the fold. The way to get past that problem is to edit the existing thread of "Self-Evident Propositions?" You do that (once you've signed in, same as you did to make a new post) by clicking on the pencil (or crayon, or whatever "kind" of thing the icon is supposed to be) at the bottom of the post.

Unless you object, I propose to delete both of your most recent posts (as separate posts) because I have copied them for you into the thread "Self-Evident Propositions?" If you would find that objectionable, please let me know.

Regards,
Simplicimus

Good Simplicmus,
I was unable to follow your directions on my most recent post because I did not see a pencil at the bottom of your response.

Pseudo Dionysus

Natural Law: Self-Evident Propositions?

In the post on "Dogs vs. wolves," Dionysus writes: Please address the problem of axioms or self-evident propositions, Simplicimus. When you claim that it is arbitrary to privilege essential traits, it is as if you were claiming that there is no such thing as relevance. You must respond to my suggestions for beginning points if the dialogue is to go forward.

Simplicimus responds:

Dionysus, It's a pleasure to hear from you again.

In my response to your first post, on "A few more natural law concepts," I did not discuss the idea of self-evident propositions, because it did not appear to have been raised in your post. Since I do not want to ignore you or your arguments, let's start this as a new discussion on self-evident propositions. Some starting questions:

• Do they exist? And assuming (as I assume you will) that they do exist...
  
• Are they universal, or may be limited by culture?
  
• Are they eternal, or limited to circumstances and context?
  
• What criteria must be met to be a self-evident proposition?
  
• Anything else that you may wish to discuss about them.

While I'm open to being persuaded that there are self-evident propositions, the assertion that they exist is not self-evident. Before we can begin to consider whether such things exist in the real world, you'll need to define the term.

Then, we'll have to deal with the fact that what seems self-evident to one person is not self-evident to another. (Much, as the press likes to note, "One man's terrorist may be another man's freedom fighter.") You can claim that the guy who doesn't "get it" is lazy, uninformed, perhaps even "disordered," but you'll need to make that case.

To get to a specific example, it seems to me that, if there are any self-evident propositions, then the prohibition against murder would be the most likely candidate. But even there, you have significant differences of opinion cross-culturally and over time. To take a few examples:

• Some think that killing in war is justified, some not
• Some think that capital punishment is justified, some not
• Romans once thought that it was fine to kill unwanted infants by exposure
• Many cultures have engaged in human sacrifice

So, even in the presumably strongest candidate of homicide, there is not much universality to be found. You may well say that universality (or near-universality, allowing for some percentage of simpletons) is not required. This relates to the objection raised by Academicius in "Natural Law: What Is It?"

Academicious: I think it is a fallacy to think that the general opinion is relevant here. In this case, the burden on natural-law advocates is to make a valid argument for some version of natural law from plausible premises, which is a standard of justification which is independent of the feelings or opinions of any particular person, or of mankind in general.

If you'd care to define your term "self-evident propositions. and tell me what evidence or logic should demonstrate that they exist, then I'll be happy to get back to you.

Regards,
Simp

Dionysus replies:

Hello, Simplicimus. Here is candidate for a self-evident truth, or a truth anyway which does not require an argument but only needs to be contemplated to be acknowledged:

Things in nature can only exist as kinds of things.

Let me know whether you agree with this, and then I will expound on what may follow from this first principle of metaphysics, namely that "kinds" or "species" (the Greek eidon which Plato used for the concept of forms or ideas) possess or present properties without which they would not be the kinds or species that they are.

From there, Simplicimus, the road to Rome will be clear.

Simplicimus replies:

Greetings, Dionysus,

You have a curious style: first you criticize me for failing to respond to a point that you'd not yet raised, then when I do respond to it, you decline my invitation to define what you're talking about, and instead ask me your question above.

D, your approach has the feel of slyness. I'd guess that you were very good at sneaking your wine past the prefects into the Academy. (As my mama don' tol' me, "Beware of Greeks bearing splits!")

Since being cross-examined by a mysterious stranger is not without an element of interest, I'm willing to play along with your game, if only to see where the ride might take us (to mix metaphors). However, I do so in the expectation that, at some point, you will settle down and define what you mean by a self-evident proposition, and describe the criteria that would allow me to know one when I trip over it. After all, it's only when I understand what you mean that I can meaningfully discuss it. (Now that's a self-evident proposition, if there ever was one.) And if you ultimately are unwilling to define your terms, we probably should stop wasting these pixels.

So, on that basis, on to your axiom: "Things in nature can only exist as kinds of things."

Honestly, I have no very clear idea what that's supposed to mean. (Again, it would be so much more efficient if you'd define your terms and ask me to react to them.)

Giving it my best shot, I assume that you mean that if a thing exists, it must be part of a "kind" of similar things.

Off the top of my head, I think I have a quibble and a fundamental disagreement with that statement.

As to the quibble, a thing can exist that is not part of a kind, if it is sui generis. The incarnate Son of God would be one example. If a thing is unique, it does not need a "kind" to exist. (As I think about it, that may not be such a trivial point.)

And, I disagree with the statement at a more fundamental level. A "kind" is just a category, which is an abstraction that we humans impose on reality to simplify and organize it. We don't ordinarily think about that, since categories are so much a part of our culture that we take them for granted, like the fish doesn't notice the water.

But when you think about it, it's clear that the categories that we choose to impose are abstractions that we invent: the thing exists even before we invent a category for it. Before cavemen invented the ideas of family, herd, or flock, the things that they categorized in those terms nonetheless existed. So, it was not necessary for the "kind" of family, herd or flock to exist for the things to exist.

And, those abstractions are, at a basic level arbitrary: we select which attributes that we want to emphasize in sorting things into categories (or "kinds"). Different people will select different attributes for sorting. And cultures that do not value an attribute often will not have a "kind" for it, although other cultures do.

But the fundamental truth is that things exist, whether or not we choose to categorize them into "kinds."

Saying that categories that we choose to impose on reality are arbitrary (subjective) is not the same as saying that they are useless or irrelevant. It is very useful to organize reality into boxes: we humans could not function at a very high level without doing so. Reality has too many inputs on our sensory system not to categorize, so that we do not have to analyze similar things anew every time we confront them.

Far more important, lawyers could not practice without categories (or "kinds") to argue about. And if they couldn't practice, it would be extremely difficult to justify their bills. And lawyers not being able to bill would be "disordered."

So, we can recognize both the utility and the underlying subjectivity (ultimate arbitrariness) of the categories or kinds that we impose to help us make sense of the world. You might even say that "all nature is ordered to fit the categories that we've chosen."

In conclusion, categories/kinds are extremely helpful to us in ordering our sense inputs of the world, so we should not abandon them, even though they are inherently subjective. However, we also should be extremely careful about trying to make moral judgments based on those arbitrary categories.

Now, if you'd like to tell me what you understand your sentence to mean, maybe we can see if there is ground for agreement. Even more interesting, frankly, would be to know what you consider to be the "kind" that is called "self-evident propositions."

And, I've never been to Rome, so your showing me the way will be most welcome.

Categorically yours,
Simplicimus

Dionysus responds:

My dear Simplicimus:

When we are slandered, we answer kindly (I believe St. Paul said that). I did define "self-evident proposition," but perhaps you did not have ears to hear, in the words of Isaiah and your Lord and mine. I said it was a proposition which does not require an argument. Another definition is "a proposition whose truth is accepted as soon as its terms are understood." You do not complain that you do not understand the terms "exist," "nature," and "thing" in the proposition, "Whatever exists in nature must exist as a kind of thing." "Kind" is a troublemaker for you, and you claim that kind terms or sortals are constructions that we humans find useful for categorizing and organizing the world and in general making sense of what we encounter out there, presumably so we can make a better use of the world and meet our "seeming needs" (in Yeats's phrase) more efficiently. According to you, these kinds into which we place things are at bottom arbitrary, that is, devised for purposes we determine according to whatever standard we wish to adopt, purposes therefore which we could have determined far otherwise than in fact we did.

Now I submit, fellow Christian, that you do not believe that all or even most sortals are human constructions, arbitrary or otherwise. "Orchard," for instance, is a quite different sortal from "apple tree." Orchards and the term which identifies them are the product of human intervention in the course of nature. You cannot go to an orchard and investigate it to find out more about what makes it an orchard. You can, however, go to what you have already identified as an apple tree and investigate it and others of its kind and discover properties of apple trees and apples which you did not previously know existed. Why are you able to do this? Because apples and the trees they grow on are natural kinds, kinds with natures which are not completely known to us but which exist independently of our perceptions, understanding, and categorizations; and which an investigation can therefore reveal more about to us.

Other than Jesus, what has existed in nature (existed in the world of space and time accessible to the senses) which has not belonged to a kind, whether natural or artificial? I swum the Tiber in my mother's womb, but for yourself you need to answer this question. The fate of the Counter-Reformation hangs on your answer.

Simplicimus replies:

Dear D,

We may or may not be getting anywhere. We certainly are not getting there fast.

If you'd like to move this discussion along at a more reasonable rate, just tell me what you mean by your proposed axiom that "Things in nature can only exist as kinds of things." I will then tell you whether or not I agree with it.

Nonetheless, I'll try again to respond to your latest points, on the basis of what I think you mean.

On Terms:

You wrote, "You do not complain that you do not understand the terms "exist," "nature," and "thing" in the proposition". That is correct, to avoid what may be pointless pedantry, I did not raise any quibbles with those terms as I understand them. But there is no guarantee that I am understanding them as you do, so we aren't (or I'm not) sure whether we are even beginning to discuss the same things. To give just one example, I assume that the proposition's use of "thing" includes living beings; you may well not understand it that way. I don't know whether you do, or whether it makes any difference.

Keep in mind that, if you are going to pose a proposition, it's your job both to define and defend it.

On the Definition of "Self-evident Proposition":

I will be happy to work with your definition of a self-evident proposition (a "SEP"): a proposition which does not require an argument. Another definition is "a proposition whose truth is accepted as soon as its terms are understood."

Now, we can begin to explore whether such a rara avis exists in the real world, which is what I assume you were setting out to do with your proposition about things having to exist in kinds (of which more later).

Before we leave this definition though, I'd like to know whether we're dealing with inductino or deduction in a SEP. When you say "does not require an argument" and "is accepted" (the passive voice is not much liked), do you mean not required/is accepted automatically by nearly everyone (so that we can look to universal or near-universal acceptance as evidence of a SEP)? or that the SEP, as a deductive logical matter, does not require proof/is accepted (so that deduction is key and popular opinion is irrelevant)?

On Mixing Apples and Sortals:

D, I'm afraid you lost me in your paragraph on apple trees and apple orchards. I'll respond to what I think I understand you to be saying.

I agree that things are either natural or man-made (or man-caused, as in planting an apple tree). However, as I'm using the term "kinds" to mean man-made categories for organizing "things," there are no "natural kinds" (as you put it). You'll have to clarify what you were saying before I can give much more of a response.

BTW, thank you for the designatipon "fellow Christian" (I assume that it was complimentary), and I like the term "sortals." One could say that I'm saying that all sortals are mortal sortals.

On the Sui Generis:

You ask, "Other than Jesus, what has existed in nature (existed in the world of space and time accessible to the senses) which has not belonged to a kind, whether natural or artificial?"

First, as noted above, I interpret "kind" as a man made conceptual construction; it's the thing that makes up the kind that is either natural or artificial (by which I assume you mean man-made or man-caused).

Being the inventive creatures that we are, we always can conceptualize a "kind" to cover any thing (or group of things). We consider it pretty useless, so don't bother, to create a "kind" (category, set) for only one member, but we could do it. So there is no thing for which mankind could not create a "kind".

On the Fate of the Counter-Reformation:

You ended: "I swum the Tiber in my mother's womb, but for yourself you need to answer this question. The fate of the Counter-Reformation hangs on your answer."

Don't brag: you didn't swim, you crossed; your mother swam. And, for that matter, I don't believe that your mother swam it either. I think it's something you dreamed up in one of your Dionysian baccanals. Which makes one ask, D, are you a "kind" of exaggerator?

More substantively, oh my! If the fate of the Counter-Reformation hangs on the answer of a Protestant named Simplicimus, then the C-R is leaning on a slender reed indeed.

I look forward to hearing more from you, Dionysus. I know that we'll get along swimmingly.

Kindly yours,
Simplicimus

Dogs vs. wolves

Dogs and wolves are cross fertile (which has caused problems for the preservation of an endangered species of wolf in the Ethiopian highlands (13,000 feet) because loose dogs keep mating with the wolves). If there is an essential difference between dogs and wolves it is in the attribute of tameness. No dog who was not more tame than a wolf would be a dog. So the essential characteristic that dachshunds and Dobermans share is docibility. The color of a dog's fur, on the other hand, is an accidental trait, and even if an owner breeds dogs for a certain color, coat color is not an essential property of any dog--a change in coat color would not affect his "dogness."

Please address the problem of axioms or self-evident propositions, Simplicimus. When you claim that it is arbitrary to privilege essential traits, it is as if you were claiming that there is no such thing as relevance. You must respond to my suggestions for beginning points if the dialogue is to go forward.

A few more natural-law concepts

Dionysus writes:

None of the possible "purposes" of a dog listed by Simplicicus in his question about the arbitrariness of the concept of purpose, goal, end, or any other translation of the Greek telos is a candidate for an essential end of a dog. All the possible ends which are cited by Simplicicus are "accidental" ends of dogs based on their usefulness to the human species. The essential ends and "proper functioning" of a dog are determined by its form (or nature or internal structure) which distinguishes it from individuals of other species. Thus it is an end determined by dog nature that dogs are pack animals, or that they care for their young. It is an end not determined by dog nature that some dogs walk on their hind legs some of the time. But whether even this last end is arbitrary is open to question. I would like to suggest that the term "arbitrary" cannot have any place in discussions of ends or purposes. The concept of an end is inherently rational. This seems to be an axiom you are unwilling to accept, Simplicicus. Yet all the ends we can conceive are either set by nature, which makes them natural and therefore rational in the sense that laws of nature (where law includes the concept of rationality) must be followed by individual members of species if those individuals are to function properly (or flourish or achieve eudaimonia); or they are set by human beings, which makes them rational in the sense that the human being set the end for a reason. (Part of the view I am advocating here is that the term "good reason" is a redundancy, while the term "bad reason" is either figurative or contradictory. Thus the only ends which should be considered arbitrary are ends which go against the good as it is determined by the essential properties of species. This would mean that it is not an arbitrary end of human beings to breed dogs to herd sheep, nor is it an arbitrary end of dogs to herd sheep under the command of human beings: both of these ends and activities conform to the natures of both species.) If you wish to deny the claims of natural law, you must begin by defending the claim that we can interpret the natural world wholly without reference to ends. Whatever their protestations to the contrary, even the Darwinists cannot do this since they accept the axiom that life itself (or biological existence itself) seeks its own continuation, which is certainly the concept of an end.

Simplicimus replies:

Oh, Dionysus, you party animal, you!

Once again, I may not have been clear in discussing arbitrariness. (I may need the nine lives of a cat to reach clarity, while here we are stuck with dogs!)

On arbitrariness of purposes: I do not say that purposes are arbitrary, although anyone who's watched an 11-year-old boy carving wood is likely to conclude that arbitrary purposes are possible.

Rather, I am saying that it is arbitrary for a teleologist to assign "the essential purpose" of a thing or organism. Every thing and every organism has many attributes, and may have many purposes.

It is not that purposes are arbitrary (if I make a shovel, I've made it for a purpose), it's the designation by the teleologist (a third party) of an essential purpose that is arbitrary. Who are you (or I, or or Aristotle, or even the SPCA) to say what is the "essential purpose"?

Now, if all that you mean by "essential purpose" is that an organism is to be what it is, as described by its attributes, then that that is either a meaningless or a loaded use of the word "purpose".

To suggest that an organism is "meant" by nature to be what it is has no meaning at all, in which case you could better avoid the term "purpose" entirely and simply note that the creature has certain attributes.

On the other hand, if you mean by "essential purpose" that there was a creator whose will can be discerned from the attributes that he gave the creature, then that is a loaded use of the term purpose, and we'd need to deal with proof of the creator, as well as divination of his will.

And it still would be a conclusion that requires defense to go on from the established fact of a creator, to argue that the attributes given by the creator imply a purpose. Perhaps, like the divine clockmaker so popular in the 18th century, he just set the machinery in motion, with no purpose other than to sit back and watch the show. Or, arguably, he might (like the auto industry) have intentionally built the system to move toward obsolescence and decay, rather than to strive toward maximization of form.

I'm not saying that there cannot be a purpose. I'm saying that whatever "purpose" we may want to propose requires more than just the simple fact of attributes.

That's where the wheels come off the logical cart for teleology: in the end, it seems to me, the teleological discussion of "essential purpose" necessarily collapses into a mere description of attributes. As noted above, that's an extremely weak (or misleading) use of the term "purpose"; and it's an unsatisfactory one, since what the teleologist really wants to do is to go on from those attributes to make moral judgments about what that creature should (or should not) do.

On the purpose of "dogness":

Would you say that variations between species of dog-like creatures (dog, fox, wolf) lead to creatures having different essential purposes? What about intra-species variations, as among breeds of dogs (dachshund, doberman)? And what is the teleological conclusion from differences among individuals within a breed or species?

On "Purpose" in Darwinism: Darwinism (and I'll use it here interchangeably with evolutionary theory, though I'm sure that a specialist in the field would wince) offers two good examples of the problem of inferring a "purpose" from attributes.

First, I acknowledge Darwinism does observe that genes are chemically programmed to reproduce themselves, leading to behaviors in the organisms that (in general) promote that reproduction. That's an observation of fact, not a moral value or judgment. It's simply an observation of how genetic material has structured itself (or been structured -- we haven't got into that discussion). While I obviously cannot prove this, I very much doubt that most careful Darwinist scientists would use the word "purpose" in their description of that fact, if they thought it was going to be used to imply moral judgments.

Obviously, many Darwinists do in fact purport to make value/moral judgments (e.g., it's wrong to kill whales or other endangered species) -- they're only human (the Darwinists, not the whales). But they're not being consistent, in that they only complain about humans, not other organisms, doing the killing. Nature involves inter-species rivalries, even unto death. Indeed, evolution requires it.

Also, many of the value judgments that they make ("It's wrong to wear fur.") are based on values entirely outside of Darwinism. You need something more than the Darwinist observation that genes work to pass on their genetic information in order to be able to argue that there is a "purpose" to an organism that would allow you to make moral judgments.

Second, Darwinism famously entails evolution. By your standard, it appears that natural evolution would be an offense against nature, because an organism, instead of realizing its "purpose" of perfecting what it "is" instead is changing to become something new.

And I got through all that without a single pun about "dogma". There really is order in the universe!

Regards,
Simplicimus

Natural Law: On Sex

EDITOR'S NOTE: Warning! This topic will involve content not suitable for children. Much as we try to keep this blog a family-friendly environment, it is impossible to address the topic of natural law of sex without some fairly graphic discussions. Proceed at your own risk, and keep out of reach of children!

BACKGROUND: Scholasticus and Teleologus have told us that Natural Law theory, based on teleology, leads to the conclusion that a shockingly broad (okay, that was a loaded description) array of behaviors is an "offense against nature," and, as Scholasticus' puts it, "devalues what makes us human."

As the range of those teleologically-proscribed activities grew, they reached the point where the assembled rabble responded with a large raspberry, by which they meant (if a rabble can have a meaning), "I don't think so, Bub!" (or the Greco-Roman equivalent thereof).

In separate posts, we expect that Scholasticus will pursue a number of fascinating issues, such as unreasonably dangerous activities (you won't believe what he knows about AEA) and pornography (alas, no pictures).

On a slightly different track, Teleologus was kind enough to present an argument for what many in the rabble considered a remarkable conclusion of teleology, to wit: mutual masturbation by a hetero married couple, to orgasm, without pornography (henceforth, "Clean Marital Manipulation" or "CMM") is an offense against nature. The discussion picks up with his teleological proof.

Teleologus:

1. Sex is ordered toward procreation.
2. Marital masturbation (one hetero spouse for the other), even without pornography, is inconsistent with, and disrespectful to, the teleology of the complementary bodies of the spouses. (Here, "marital masturbation" meant not in the sense of mere foreplay, but in the sense that the husband ejaculates in such a way that the act counts as "masturbation.")
3. Hence, [CMM] is an offense against nature."
   

Simplicimus replies:

My dear friend, Teleologus,

You thought I was avoiding you, didn't you?

Thank you for laying out the teleological chain of reasoning regarding the unnaturalness of CMM.

It won't surprise you that that reasoning does not "do it" for me, so I'll lay out some preliminary thoughts. In order to be clear, I'll respond to your points 1 and 2 above separately.

Simplicimus on the assertion that "Sex is ordered toward procreation"

You seem to get an awful lot of mileage out of the phrase "ordered toward." I agree that sex often involves procreation, and if that were all you meant, we'd be in agreement. However, I also observe that sex involves pleasure, unity-building in the couple, and possibly other benefits (exercise?).

While contemplating your argument, I ran across a report of a recent study in Sweden, which concluded that good sex at home reduces stress at work. (Link: http://www.myfoxny.com/dpp/news/offbeat/dpgo_Study_Good_Sex_Helps_Job_Performance_mb_06062009_2547800) So, based on that study, one could claim that "sex is ordered to producing relaxed workers." (Why don't you stick that up your teleological pipe and smoke it!)

So, while I recognize the role of reproduction in sex, I do not privilege it over other benefits (or purposes) for engaging in sexual activity. Having sex for fun/pleasure is as legitimate as having sex to produce a baby.

The case of an infertile couple illustrates this quite vividly. Although they clearly are not having sex for procreation, their sex is no less "natural" or "right" than is the sex of a couple that can, or even wants to, conceive.

Furthermore, while I would not argue that a human life is a negative, I firmly believe that the decision to make a life can be unwise or "disordered" (if I used that term).

You're going to have to go beyond the mere assertion that "sex is ordered toward procreation" and show the reasoning on which you can claim that procreation has a higher standing than the other benefits/purposes of sex. (Even if your point is a "metaphysical judgment" rather than a "moral judgment," and I'm not clear as to the difference between them, it's a form of judgment or conclusion that must be explained and defended.) In doing so, I expect that you will refer to self-evident propositions, which is a topic that we should pursue further, but probably best under the separate post of that title, which is being pursued with great "essential purpose" by Dionysus.

Purposefully yours,
Simp

Duns Scotus joins the discussion:

Just so Simplicimus doesn’t feel too lonely . . .

I think that his question about the infertile couple is an important one, and just so it doesn’t get lost, I’ll raise it in a different way. If the possibility of procreation must be present for sex to have a unitive function, then should all women become celibate around age 50, after they stop ovulating? (Or should we say that openness to children is still present in some metaphysical sense?)

Given personal experience, having had a vasectomy many years ago, I’d have to partly agree with the proposition that the most loving, intimate sex, unitively speaking, takes place between a man and a woman when they are deliberately trying to conceive a child. On the other hand, I can’t believe that sex post-vasectomy ceased to have a unitive function in my marriage. That certainly is not my subjective impression.

Therefore, I’m forced to the conclusion, so far, that sex even with birth control, can have a unitive effect, though perhaps not the fullest.

Now, talk about an area of inquiry in which less precision can be expected, than say, geometry! (Perhaps the cradle Lutheran in me is a touch worried about legalism here.)

I don’t see yet, how the teachings of Moses and Jesus on these issues are present in the silent order of nature, once they are pointed out. I don’t even see where Moses or Jesus deal with the issue, but will hope for correction. Where does either set forth a proposition, directly or by inference, that unity in marriage is impossible when the procreative possibility is closed?

Duns Scotus

Simplicimus continues his response to Teleologus:

Teleologus,

As to the second point in your proof, that "[CMM] is inconsistent with, and disrespectful to, the teleology of the complementary bodies of the spouses."

This clearly requires defense rather than mere assertion of the claim. I don't at all see how this point 2 follows from point 1, nor how it is "self-evident".

Rather, I see plenty of complementarity: the wife has a hand, and the husband has something to put in it, and vice versa, to their mutual enjoyment and unity.

It seems to me that what you are saying is the equivalent of "the mouth is ordered to eating, so it is an offense against nature to use it for talking, smiling, or blowing bubbles." I don't get that conclusion at all, so please expand your assertion into an argument. (And what have you got against bubbles?)

Complementary yours,
Simplicimus


Duns Scotus re-enters the discussion:

Teleologus,

I'm behind on this, so I hope that this hasn't come up already.

I have some questions about the first premise, "Sex is ordered toward procreation."

My problem with it is not that I think it's wrong, exactly, but too simple. Why not take this as a major premise:

"Human sex is ordered to procreation and unity between husband and wife," with the
understanding that "and" includes "or"?

That doesn't seem unreasonable to me on the surface.

Natural law seems to be the only logical approach to ethics for Christians, but my difficulty is how to arrive at the main premises. Scholasticus points out, very persuasively, that conduct which empirically results in damage (gluttony, lust, etc.) would naturally be contrary to what God and nature have in mind. So I agree that auto-erotic asphyxiation is an example of unnatural conduct and that it sheds light on the discussion. I don't see how it is so obvious to establish that various forms of birth control are irrational. They may even be productive of good. Scholasticus has done a good job of presenting the negative argument on birth control, but if we get into a classic balancing analysis of its good and bad points, I don't think a clear cut answer appears.

So, to get back to major premises, induction from human experience doesn't get us in any
simple way to the premise that "Sex is ordered to procreation," which excludes other good
that might derive from sex and exclude some evils that might arise from procreation.

Finally, does reasoning about natural law come down to something like a utilitarian analysis?

Duns Scotus

Teleologus replies:

Simplicimus:

Thank you for faithfully recapitulating my argument for the wrongness of CCM. Please note that, as far as I remember, I never claimed that the second premise follows from the first or that either premise is "self evident." I claimed that the premises are true and that they support the conclusion, that the truth of the first premise is intelligible though not sense-perceptible, that one can understand that sex is ordered toward procreation.

You write that I "get a lot of mileage" out of the phrase "ordered toward." OK, feel free to substitute the word "for" for "ordered toward" anywhere you want and my meaning will not change much. Now you seem to get a lot of mileage out of conflating effects and purposes. You cite the possibility of sex-for-pleasure-and-exercise, citing the possibility of attaining those effects through sex, but not all effects are purposes, and subjectively intended “purpose” does not determine objective purpose.

If you are driving your car, you are (a) employing your car as a means of transportation and (b) consuming fuel. Consuming fuel is a constant effect of your driving, but it is hardly the purpose of driving. All vehicles use fuel, but the purpose of a vehicle is not to use fuel. That is something that must be understood rather than perceived through the senses because on the empirical level, effects are on all fours with each other; that one effect is the purpose over and above other effects is something intelligible.

Also, I can use my car (I can assign it a "purpose" that I determine subjectively) to hold down a pile of leaves, but that is not the purpose of my car or of any other vehicle (except for the GM Leaf-Holder-Downer).

How does this apply to sex? Even current human physiology textbooks, produced in this politically correct culture, still, presumably, refer to the human reproductive system as the "human reproductive system," which illustrates how teleology is inescapable, even for those who wish to vigorously reject it.

If we can establish that not all effects are purposes, then it seems to me that the pleasure of sex is an effect that promotes the purpose(s) of sex. That the effect is subservient to the purpose (think again of using fuel and transportation) is a relationship can be read in "the silences of Nature."

Again, those purposes should not be intentionally disconnected: If a man says that he wants to unify his body with his girlfriend's, but he doesn't want to become one in the child they might produce, and so uses a condom, he is saying something like, "I want to become one with you (beast-with-two-backs)," "but I don't want to become one with you (snot-nosed brat with your eyes and my bad teeth)." See the contradiction involved in intentionally trying to separate the two purposes?

My other friends, Duns Scotus and Erasmus have, like Simplicimus, expressed concerns that the view I have been defending would deny that sex could be used for its unitive purpose apart from its procreative purpose. Infertile couples and couples passed child-bearing age, then, would need to become celibate. Not so.

The key here is the difference between respecting the teleology of the male and female bodies, and "using" one another. A husband and wife in their sixties enjoying the marital embrace are doing nothing intentionally inconsistent with both purposes of sex--unitive and procreative--even though they almost certainly won't conceive a child. A man and woman in their twenties using artificial contraception likewise will almost certainly not conceive a child, but their embrace is intentionally limited: they are doing something to purposely block the purpose of what they are doing.

As for CMM, again, as I said before, I don't see how that fulfills either the procreative or the unitive purpose of sex, because it is ordered toward (or "for") neither procreation nor even union: the two persons are literally not uniting at all. CMM seems ordered toward pleasure, entertainment, recreation, and as such seems "ordered toward" hedonism and narcissism.

Simplicimus responds:

Dear Teleologus,

As you will have noticed, I moved your comment up to become an element of this post on the Natural Law of Sex, so that those following the discussion can see the chain in one place, without having to hop to the comments. It also remains in the Comment section, in case you'd particularly wanted it there.

Your most recent post has a lot of content, and a lot to be unpacked to make sure that I understand it, even before I try to react to it. So, I'll respond in tranches, roughly a paragraph at a time.

You wrote, "Please note that, as far as I remember, I never claimed that the second premise follows from the first or that either premise is "self evident." I claimed that the premises are true and that they support the conclusion, that the truth of the first premise is intelligible though not sense-perceptible, that one can understand that sex is ordered toward procreation."

On Premises and Arguments: If I understand the above, you are saying that the line of argument for your position on CMM consists of two premises and a conclusion. You're the expert on logic, so that may be okay, but shouldn't there be an argument in there somewhere? Do two premises really lead to a conclusion? I'm going to leave it to you to tell me whether that works. If I go in there, I might not come out: lost amid the circles within circles, as it were.

On "Intelligible though not Sense-perceptible": As you know, I've been stumbling through a discussion with Dionysus, regarding "self-evident propositions" ("SEP"). Dionysus seems to have taken the approach that an SEP is discovered by inductive reasoning (by it wouldn't be an SEP if it could be proven deductively), but it's not yet clear how that inductive process works to ensure that we have a valid, real-world SEP that can be relied upon for drawing moral (or other) conclusions. So, I've not yet got a good handle on what constitutes a SEP, or what tells me I've found one.

However, I'd assumed that all you teleolophiles rely on the SEP to cover those elements of your argument that can't be proven deductively, but which you somehow perceive are nonetheless true, as Dionysus does. Now, you come along and say "I never claimed that ... either premise is "self evident." I claimed that ... the truth of the first premise is intelligible though not sense-perceptible." (Shortening your statement to focus on the distinction that you seem to have made.)

You're really trying to confuse me! Your distinction between a SEP and a premise whose truth is "intelligible though not sense-perceptible" (for now, the "ITNSP" -- got a better acronym for that one, Bud?), now means that I have two concepts to understand. I will continue to pursue the SEP with Dionysus (and you're more than welcome to jump in there). What I need from you is an explanation of how I can know that something is true though its truth is not sense-perceptible. And, if you're feeling really charitable, I'd love for you to explain how that differs from an SEP.

To help kick off our discussion of the ITNSP, I fully accept that one can deal logically with things that are not sense-perceptible through deductive reasoning. For example, the number pi is a complete abstraction, not sense-perceptible in any sense of the term. Nonetheless, mathematicians can do proofs regarding properties of pi. But those are all deductive proofs.

I assume that you are not proposing to provide a deductive proof of the truth of your premises. If so, you would not need the whole ITNSP thing, you'd just lay out the deductive proof.

The only other logical approach that I'm aware of (I'm clearly not a philosopher) is induction. But induction is reasoning from experience, and experience necessarily involves our senses, so I cannot imagine how it could be possible to create an inductive argument to show the truth of the ITNSP, which by definition is not sense-perceptible.

Fortunately, we are not constrained by the limitations of my imagination, so I look forward to your explaining to me how you approach showing the truth of an ITNSP premise. Once I understand your approach to knowing ITNSPs, then we can discuss whether it works in general, and then whether it works specifically with respect to the two premises in your argument under discussion.

I think that that's all that I can do with the first paragraph, for now. I'll look forward to your response to the above, and I'll get back to you when I can on the second paragraph.

Thank you, Teleologus, for all the time you spend educating me. I'm grateful -- and glad that you don't charge by the hour!

Sensitively,
Simplicimus


Simplicimus continues his response to Teleologus:

You wrote: "You write that I "get a lot of mileage" out of the phrase "ordered toward." OK, feel free to substitute the word "for" for "ordered toward" anywhere you want and my meaning will not change much. Now you seem to get a lot of mileage out of conflating effects and purposes. You cite the possibility of sex-for-pleasure-and-exercise, citing the possibility of attaining those effects through sex, but not all effects are purposes, and subjectively intended “purpose” does not determine objective purpose."

On Effects and Purposes:

I am not sure that I'm getting mileage out of anything, but let's discuss "effects and purposes."

I assume that we both agree that there are certain identifiable attributes associated with a particular activity. To use the example of sex, we both should be able to acknowledge that the consequences include:

• reproduction (note that I list your favorite first -- you can thank me later)
• building unity in the couple (the favorite of my wife, Mrs. Simpi)
  
• enjoyment (my favorite -- I know, I'm a dog)
• exercise
• the one million other aspects that we haven't and probably don't need to identify

Now, here's where the rubber hits the road for teleology: what allows you to say that reproduction is a "purpose" and exercise is an "effect"? Similarly, reproduction over enjoyment or over building unity?

I think that the participants are free to choose the purpose(s) they prefer, from among all the attributes of an activity.

In fact, we are pretty clearly back in our discussion of arbitrariness (or subjectivity) of teleology: one man's "effect" is another's "purpose".

The characteristic Simplicimus view is quite simplistic: people can choose the attributes that they wish as the "purpose" of an activity in a particular situation. For an infertile couple, reproduction will never be their purpose of sex. Enjoyment, unity, exercise, or something else can be. For a fertile couple, it's also true that their purpose in sex may be something other than reproduction. And it is important to note that purpose is not fixed: for the same person or couple, different attributes may be selected as the purpose of the moment, from time to time. I am confident that you will agree that different couples will have different purposes for their sexual activity, and the same couple at different times also will have different purposes.

Who says that you teleologues (or Masters and Johnson, or Hugh Heffner, or Miss Manners, or anyone else) are in a position to tell these couples what should be "the" purpose for their sexual interaction? and in all times and all situations?

So, if the couples involved think that they have various motives, what is the analysis that allows you to say that there is one "right" or "fundamtenal" or "essential" purpose to sex, which somehow is not only more important than other purposes, but enables you to judge those other purposes? Inquiring minds want to know.

On an "Objective Purpose": You've now introduced a new term into our discussion, "obective purpose".

I've already said that I think that all purposes are subjective: the creator of a thing has one purpose, the user has one or many other purposes. There's no way to say who's purpose is "right" and whose "wrong"; it's all a question of whose perspective is relevant at the time. (Since we are not discussing theology, I'm leaving out the possibility of a divine purposes here.)

I suspect that you're going to tell me that "objective purpose" is what gives you standing to say what is the "right" or "fundamental" or "essential" purpose. If so, what designates a purpose to be an "objective purpose"? How do we know one when we see it? For example, I agree that reproduction often is "a" purpose of sex, but not always "a" purpose, and almost never "the" purpose, so what am I missing?

I also expect that you're going to tell me that an "objective purpose" is either (1) a self-evident proposition (or you would if you were Dionysus -- are you sure that he's not your evil twin brother? Are you two playing good-cop/bad-cop with my little mind?), or (2) an ITNSP (a truth that is "intelligible though not sense-perceptible").

I'm not seeing either the self-evidence or the ITNSP-ness of the assertion that the objective purpose of sex is reproduction. So, you'll need to explain to me the criteria that makes it such, or provide other examples of such truths, so that we can begin to deduce such criteria.

Please flesh out for me this concept of "objective purpose".

Purposefully yours,
Simplicimus

Natural Law: Is Teleology Inherently Arbitrary?

Simplicimus writes to Teleologus:

I share your desire for philosophy to embrace purposeful meaning of life, and often rebel against trends in modern thought.

However, isn't the loss of the idea of formal and final causes (which I think are very close, if not identical, at bottom) due to a modern recognition of arbitrariness?

At any rate, I don't see how one gets to an analysis of formal and final causes that is neither

(1) fundamentally arbitrary, nor

(2) reliant on some form of divine revelation. (We've had a similar discussion regarding ethics.)


How can one say non-arbitrarily that a dog is (or is not) for any of the following purposes?

• Companionship
• Herding sheep
• The meat dish at supper
• Medical research
• Something that we probably wouldn't think of in a thousand years

Do you see a way to square that circle?

Teleologus responds to Simplicimus:

In Aristotle, the purpose of an organism or object is found non-arbitrarily in what it is uniquely suited to do. When I teach this stuff in class, I start taking things from my briefcase and asking questions like, "Could this cell phone serve as a paperweight? It can? Well, then, is that it's purpose? No? Why not? Oh! Because it is much better used for something else, right? Could these scissors be used as a door stop? Etc."

Now what is a human being uniquely suited to do? Go swimming? Sleep in the sun? Copulate? We can do those things, but those activities are not uniquely human activities. Aristotle's answer, in a word, is think. So the purpose of human life is to think (rationally, as only humans can do, or as humans can do better than other animals that can also think). The next question is What makes something excellent? Short answer: that if fulfills its purpose well. So what makes a human an excellent human? To think well.

Thomas Aquinas gets hold of this stuff and modifies the purpose of human life to be to know and worship God, because that is what Thomas understands humans to be uniquely suited to do. What, then, is an excellent human being? One who knows and worships God well.

All this to say that there is at least a theory as to how final cause is non-arbitrary. I see the modern rejection of final cause to be based on empiricism, more so than on a recognition of arbitrariness. Final causes are not sense-perceptible in the way that material and efficient causes are. (Of course Hume famously argued that efficient causes aren't sense-perceptible either!)

Modernism and science get lots of credit from me for reducing human suffering (antibiotics! cancer surgery!) but often at the cost of removing the possibility of finding meaning in the suffering (and death) that remains part of human life.

Academicius also responds to Simplicimus:

I think that Aristotelian essentialism is a tricky notion. The reason it's tricky is because it is the concept of necessity-within-contingency. What I'm calling contingency is what you, Russ, are calling arbitrary. I know "arbitrary" and "contingent" don't have the same meaning, but in this context their meanings are similar enough that Aristotle's point goes through when you substitute "arbitrary" for "contingent." The existence of any particular thing or kind of thing is arbitrary in the sense that it it did not have to exist. This is true whether you think God created the universe or the universe as we know it evolved from some basic material constituents. God's good pleasure is not wholly arbitrary (because his will is entirely good), but there was no necessity that he should create anything. But to exist at all, at least in the material world or the world of the senses, is to exist as a kind of thing (a member of a species, if you will)--this basic metaphysical principle is implicit throughout Aristotle. So while the the existence of any particular tiger (for instance) is arbitrary in the sense that that tiger would not exist without its two particular parents (a condition which "contingent" captures better than "arbitrary"), it is necessary for it to be a tiger for it to exist at all, and that means that it is necessary for it to have the characteristics which make tigers tigers. So its "proper functioning" as a tiger is so far from being arbitrary that it could not exist at all if it did not function properly (or strive, even though unconsciously, to function properly) according to the tiger nature which determines it in existence. Its nature includes its formal cause and final cause, and its functioning in accordance with its nature is necessary in the essentialist sense of necessity--the strong metaphysical sense which makes it necessary for it to pursue the ends determined by its nature if it is to exist at all. Of course there can be arguments about what a tiger's nature or a human's nature is. But I think it's pretty implausible to argue that no ends belong to human beings just because they are human beings. For instance, taking nutrition is not arbitrarily assigned to our proper functioning. I think you can make a plausible argument that respecting the moral law is just as much a part of our proper functioning as taking nutrition, and even that loving God with a full heart and mind is just as much a part of our proper functioning, as that proper functioning is determined by our rational nature.

Simplicimus responds to Teleologus and Academicius:

I'm pretty sure that I'm talking about an arbitrariness problem, not contingency as Acad describes it. However, we'll know better as we go along.

In the course of a separate discussion on natural law and reproduction, Academicius wrote:

If belief in God is not already in place, you can make the same argument from reproduction by itself as a purpose of nature (a purpose recognized by Darwinists as well). The orientation to reproduction must be part of the human good because it is part of human nature, the human good as a rational good requires rational formation, which places constraints on the good of reproduction and requires its conscious direction toward the rational good, whatever that may be besides the orientation to reproduction. A couple not oriented by nature to reproduction because they are the same sex does not meet the essential first condition which orders themselves and their children or charges to the good of rational nature, whose pursuit under those conditions is therefore a priori disordered.

Simplicimus responded to Teleologus and Academicius:

Evidently, I'm enough of a modern that I don't even think I understand what Academicius means by the following: "you can make the same argument from reproduction by itself as a purpose of nature (a purpose recognized by Darwinists as well). The orientation to reproduction must be part of the human good because it is part of human nature..."

Nobody I know would argue that reproduction is not "a purpose of human nature" (to use your phrase: I'm still concerned that the term "purpose" (like "fideist") obscures more than it enlightens), or that reproduction is categorically not "part of the human good". Many of us would, of course, argue that, in certain circumstances, reproduction is not as good as birth control. While I respect the fact that Catholics are constrained by a doctrinal position on that point, I would defy anyone to show from natural law principles alone (independent of theology) that sex for reasons other than procreation is an offense against nature.

So, while I would never dispute that reproduction is a part of the sex experience, I do insist that it is not the totality, nor anywhere near the totality. As Erasmus noted ..., enjoyment also is a significant part, and bonding within the couple is a very significant part. There no doubt are other benefits that I'll think of later.

So, once again we encounter some of those arbitrariness objections to teleology:

1. who's place is it to say that reproduction is more important than pleasure, bonding, or other benefits, and
   
2. what proof is there that there is any definable moral "purpose" to an activity? (On that second question, we'd probably be much clearer by talking about costs and benefits rather than purposes.)

In order to make the teleological/natural law argument that I understand you both (and Scholasticus) to be making, you'd have to show that reproduction is of so much a higher order than those other benefits that it allows you to say that sexual conduct purely for pleasure, bonding, etc., is "disordered" -- or, as Scholasticus says, "dehumanizing." I don't see how you'll ever, in an objective sense, get to such a privileged status for reproduction. (Remember, I'm talking teleology and natural law here, not theology: one can do about just anything with claims to revelation.)

To me, a fundamental problem with teleology is the attempt to designate a primary purpose for things: many things have multiple purposes, and it's inherently subjective to say which is "primary". As I see it, when you argue that onanism is an offense against nature because that's not what the plumbing is "for," you also should say that the mouth is for eating, so it violates nature to use it for speaking, singing, whistling, kissing, blowing bubbles, or smiling.

Natural Law: What Is It?

Academicius wrote to Simplicimus:

I do want to comment on one of your presuppositions about what makes for a good argument (for a particular version of natural law or for any other claim).

You say that "those of you who want to assert such a natural law (similar to natural condemnation of murder) have the burden to show that mankind pretty universally has felt that homosexuality is an offense against nature, or, to use Scholasticus' happy phrase, 'devalues the traits that make us human.'"

I think it is a fallacy to think that the general opinion is relevant here. In this case, the burden on natural-law advocates is to make a valid argument for some version of natural law from plausible premises, which is a standard of justification which is independent of the feelings or opinions of any particular person, or of mankind in general.

Simplicimus responds to Academicius:

Since I am very interested in natural law (temperamentally, I'd like to see it work), I'd appreciate it if we'd pursue in more detail your objection to my assertion that natural law proponents have to show that a belief is near-universal. Actually, I did not expect that to be a controversial statement : even Aquinas agrees that basic principles of natural law are universal (S.T., Q. 94, Article 4 -- how do you guys abbreviate references to the Summa?). And when Aquinas and a Kantian agree on anything, I'd think we'd pretty well covered the field.

My experience of natural law has been that its proponents argue from the fact that "everybody recognizes X to be right/wrong" -- this is what J. Teleologus appears to do, though I may be misreading him. We could quibble over how nearly universal a view must to be in order to qualify as a "natural" law, but the idea is that if nearly everybody assigns the same moral standing to an act, then that is evidence of a natural law at work.

BTW, I say "evidence" rather than "proof" because there could be other explanations. For example, the way humans relate in societies may, in most cases, lead certain acts to be encouraged, others discouraged (e.g., murder, theft), but when social conditions change, those views of right and wrong could change. I've read Darwinist argumetns that along this line: there's no natural law (there's nothing eternal), just responses in particular places and times to the opportunities and demands of social success, and thus genetic success.

But you wrote, "I think it is a fallacy to think that the general opinion is relevant here. In this case, the burden on natural-law advocates is to make a valid argument for some version of natural law from plausible premises, which is a standard of justification which is independent of the feelings or opinions of any particular person, or of mankind in general."

Okay, I'll grant you that it might be logically possible for someone to show that something is a natural law principle apart from the evidence of its near-universal acceptance. While you did not say how that might be accomplished, I assume that you have in mind something like "first principles" reasoning. I guess we'll see in the Nicomachean Ethics how well that works. If you have some other approach in mind, I'd be interested to hear of it.

Series on Natural Law

While the Bookies are reading Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, there has been a lengthy exchange of emails concerning natural law.

I will try an experiment of putting up posts on natural law drawn from those emails, with the participants' names changed. Given the anarchic nature of multiple chains of email exchanges, these posts will not use everything, but will try to extract the arguments from the various emails, and present them here as coherent lines of discussion relating to discrete aspects of natural law.

I hope that this works.

June Book: Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics

This month's book selection is the Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle (Irwin translation suggested).

Additional resource: Thomas Aquinas' Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics

Dialogue on Calvin, nature and the knowledge of God

From an online discussion with other "Fresno Bookies."

Craig is the author of "The Trial of Man: Christianity and Judgment in the World of Shakespeare and writes at VDH, which is high up on the coolness index.

Duns Scotus wrote:

Thanks to Simplicimus, Scholasticus, and Teleologus for the great thought you've put into this discussion. It's teaching me a lot, but I continue to be troubled by things I've brought up earlier.

I'm just not seeing that big a gap between what little I know of Calvin's thought about ways of coming to know God and what I'm finding in the Catholic Catechism.

From the Catholic Catechism, paragraphs 31 to 34, in part:

31. Created in God's image and called to know and love him, the person who seeks God discovers certain ways of coming to know him. These are also called proofs for the existence of God, not in the sense of proofs in the natural sciences, but rather in the sense of "converging and convincing arguments" which allow us to attain certainty about the truth [query: what is meant by "certainty" here?]

32. The world: starting from movement, becoming, contingency, and the world's order and beauty, one can come to a knowledge of God as the origin and the end of the universe.

As St. Paul says of the Gentiles: For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived int he things that have been made.

And St. Augustine issues this challenge: Question the beauty of the earth, question the beauty of the sea, question the beauty of the air distending and diffusing itself, question the beauty of the sky...question all these realities. All respond: "See, we are beautiful." Their beauty is a profession [confessio]. These beauties are subject to change. Who made them is not the Beautiful One who is not
subject to change?

33, The human person: With his openness to truth and beauty, his sense of moral goodness, his freedom and the voice of his conscience, with his longings to the infinite and for happiness, man questions himself about God's existence. In all this he discerns signs of his spiritual soul...

[Although the above refer to proofs, it also seems to include something much more direct and intuitive than any of the classic arguments for God's existence.]

Now Calvin, and I take this from an online article by Alvin Plantinga:

http://www.leaderu.com/truth/1truth10.html

Taking it for granted, for example, that there is such a person as God and that we are indeed within our epistemic rights (are in that sense justified) in believing that there is, the Christian epistemologist might ask what it is that confers justification here: by virtue of what is the theist justified? Perhaps there are several sensible responses.

One answer he might give and try to develop is that of John Calvin (and before him, of the Augustinian, Anselmian, Bonaventurian tradition of the middle ages): God, said Calvin, has implanted in humankind a tendency or nisus or disposition to believe in him:

"There is within the human mind, and indeed by natural instinct, an awareness of divinity." This we take to beyond controversy. To prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretense of ignorance, God himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding of his divine majesty . . .

Therefore, since from the beginning of the world there has been no region, no city, in short, no household, that could do without religion, there lies in this a tacit confession of a sense of deity inscribed in the hearts of all.[2]

Calvin's claim, then, is that God has so created us that we have by nature a strong tendency or inclination or disposition towards belief in him.

Although this disposition to believe in God has been in part smothered or suppressed by sin, it is nevertheless universally present. And it is triggered or actuated by widely realized conditions:

Lest anyone, then, be excluded from access to happiness, he not only sowed in men's minds that seed of religion of which we have spoken, but revealed himself and daily disclosed himself in the whole workmanship of the universe. As, a consequence, men cannot open their eyes without being compelled to see him (p. 51).

Like Kant, Calvin is especially impressed in this connection, by the marvelous compages of the starry heavens above:

Even the common folk and the most untutored, who have been taught only by the aid of the eyes, cannot be unaware of the excellence of divine art, for it reveals itself in this innumerable and yet distinct and well-ordered variety of the heavenly host (p. 52).

And now what Calvin says suggests that one who accedes to this tendency and in these circumstances accepts the belief that God has created the world-perhaps upon beholding the starry heavens, or the splendid majesty of the mountains, or the intricate, articulate beauty of a tiny flower- is quite as rational and quite as justified as one who believes that he sees a tree upon having that characteristic being-appeared-to-treely kind of experience.

Back to Duns Scotus: I do not see a vast gap here, defined by Protestant fideism v. Catholic rationalism. Going back to the quotation of Paul in the Catholic Catechism, he says that ever since the creation of the world this knowledge has been WIDELY available, presumably to nomads in 1000 BC, who didn't know from Aquinas. Paul and Augustine seem to be describing an apprehension of God which follows so close on the experience of just being in the world that it is much closer to apprehension than deduction.]

Always looking for shortcuts,

D. Scotus

Good points that raise an interesting question.

It may not be apparent, but most of my interest in these topics are historical. I'm interested in what people thought at various points in time and how that informed their view of the world. I'm not as up on Calvin and Calvinism as I'd like to be, but I have some clues from different sources.

For example, Calvinism tends to be systematic and logical in its approach to theology. If you communicate with Calvinists, you can see how they ride a few first principles to absolutely logical conclusions. I understand that this style comes from Calvin's Institutes. Presumably, this feature of Calvinist thought was what made it a force to be reckoned with by both Catholicism and Lutheranism.

It also appears that Calvin straddled a middle position between intellectualism and nominalism. Check out this article.

Though proponents of the idea that nominalism is the great enemy of natural law have identified the Reformers rather generally in the nominalist school, (12) the via antiqua in fact shaped the thought of several of the prominent Reformers. (13) Calvin is perhaps as difficult as any of them to categorize. Scholars have suggested many but have been able to prove few direct nominalist influences upon Calvin's early thought, (14) and his mature theology reflects a strident opposition to any form of extreme voluntarism that puts God ex lex. (15) Whether Calvin can be categorized as a nominalist or not, however, does not predetermine his status as a theologian of natural law.

Calvin had an idea called De Regnis Duobus - the Two Kingdoms - which I seem to have been misunderstanding, although I was participating in a Calvinist blog with that name, until I got tired of the Calvinist participants' inability to not use terms like "papist" and "Romanist" (and what is it with modern Calvinists who think it is de rigeur to sound like 17th Century bigots?). The article observes:

What then of Calvin's view of human ability to understand the heavenly things, that is, things pertaining to "the kingdom of God, and spiritual discernment?" In regard to knowledge of God and salvation, the first two branches of spiritual knowledge, Calvin believed that "men otherwise the most ingeneous are blinder than moles" and that "human reason makes not the least approach" in its understanding. The "natural man," who excels in all of the things listed in the previous paragraph, "has no understanding in the spiritual mysteries of God." (73) In Calvin's mind, therefore, the possibilities of human achievement in the earthly and heavenly things could not differ more greatly.

And:

For Calvin, the sinful human person, by use of reason and natural knowledge, can attain to great things in the domain of earthly things, that is, of the civil kingdom. By use of reason and natural knowledge, however, the sinful person cannot even begin to make the slightest approach to knowledge of God's being or salvation, that is, of the heavenly kingdom of Christ. Natural law, therefore, has a positive function to play in the life of the earthly, civil kingdom, according to Calvin. However, as he explains in a subsequent section, natural law has only a negative function to play in regard to spiritual things and the heavenly kingdom of Christ, where it serves merely to convict people of their sins and to strip them of all pretexts for ignorance. (74) These conclusions, therefore, show the practical context in which Calvin put natural law to work. He denied that natural law could ever give knowledge of salvation in the heavenly kingdom, even while he affirmed that it provided true and useful knowledge of mundane things in the civil kingdom.

and:

For Calvin, any action performed apart from the saving grace of Christ, arising out of the judgment of reason alone, is sinful and displeasing in God's sight. No such action can earn any merit before God. This conviction, however, pertained to matters of salvation (85) and, therefore, to the kingdom of Christ. The same action, having no value for one's standing in the kingdom of Christ, may be of great value from the perspective of the civil kingdom. The ancient lawgivers of whom Calvin wrote accomplished astonishingly great things for life in the civil kingdom, though their achievements were worthless for attaining life in the kingdom of Christ. Calvin, therefore, could attribute both a wholly negative role and a remarkably positive role to natural law not because of internal inconsistency but because the former was true for the kingdom of Christ and the latter for the civil kingdom. Barth's famous claims about Calvin on the natural knowledge of God are thus only half true. His appraisal would accurately portray Calvin as viewing the natural knowledge of God as wholly negative and merely a possibility in principle, not in reality (86)--if his discussion were limited to matters of the kingdom of Christ. In fact, however, Barth overlooked the importance of the two kingdoms doctrine at this point. His claim that Calvin always viewed the natural knowledge of God in terms of the history of salvation (87) is certainly incorrect and seems rooted in a failure to recognize that much of Calvin's treatment of this natural knowledge occurred in the context of the civil kingdom, which, as defined by Calvin himself, had nothing to do with the gospel or salvation.

So, maybe we can put Plantinga together with this article. It seems that Calvin asserted that man had naturally implanted in him by God some awareness of God. This would not necessarily involve "reason" - which, according to Aquinas, was the application of the intellect to facts obtained through the senses. Calvin's view seems to make the awareness of God prior to the senses.

Catholicism certainly recognizes a desire or an appetite toward God. It can't do otherwise without repudiating St. Augustine's dicta that "we have no rest until we rest in thee." But an "appetite" or a "desire" is simply the tendency of the will to be attracted to a "good." An appetite is not necessarily intellectual - the intellectual appetite is directed toward truth in the same way as the non-intellectual appetite is directed toward good. (Cf. "The good is that which all men desire") Catholicism does not deny that the will is always directed toward some particular good and, moreover, is ultimately directed to the Good which is behind all lesser goods. In fact, Catholicism rather has a patent on that kind of language.

According to the article, Calvin apparently denied the ability of human reason to obtain a knowledge of God's existence. I don't think that Plantinga says anything to the contrary. Plantinga's argument is that knowledge of God is "properly basic," According to Plaintinga, we are instinctively aware of God whether or not we ever open our eyes. Plantinga isn't saying - as Aquinas and para 36 of the Catechism says - that we open our eyes and we see evidence of God's handiwork through our senses from which we can deduce the existence of God.

Thinking about this approach, I can see why Calvinism may take this approach. Calvinism holds - like most nominalism - that there is an alienation of God from Creation. We cannot find God in Nature. Pace Calvin, there are natural laws that God put into Nature and which we can deduce, but those natural laws could have been entirely different. In other words, there is nothing innately good or special about the way that nature is currently ordered - the way things are ordered is good, but only because that's the way God decreed it to be.

Consequently, looking for God in nature is a waste of time, which means that we aren't going to find God in the evidence of our senses, and, therefore, any knowledge of God has to be prior and independent of our senses.

In contrast, Catholicism teaches that nature reflects the Creator and therefore we can achieve some understanding of God by examining nature, which means that it is not a waste of time to look at nature to find evidence of God.

That at least is my present take.

Quotations in the Metaphysics

I'm starting to read a chapter a day in St. Thomas' commentary on the Metaphysics.

There are a lot of good quotes in there:

"All men naturally desire to know."

"Now in men experience comes from memory."

"But we see that men of experience are more proficient than those who have theory without experience." (Too true!)

"A sign of scientific knowledge is the ability to teach." (i.e, those who can, do; those who can't, teach.)

"For it is because of wonder that men both now and formerly began to philosophize."

From St. Thomas "For when an inexperienced person acts correctly, this happens by luck" (explaining Polus' "Experience causes art and inexperience luck.")

Some clarifications

A. Fideism in Reason

To some extent I had my tongue planted in cheek when I wrote that Catholics are called on to be fideistic about reason.

Of course, that is not the gist of Catholic teaching on the subject. Rather, Catholicism affirms that natural reason is efficacious and necessary for a proper understanding of God and revealed truth. This attitude encourages reasoning about God and discourages the notion that authentic faith has to involve – as Mark Twain put it – believing in things that we know aren’t true.

A few points:

First, Vatican 1, De Filius, affirmed in Canon 1 on “Revelation”:

1. If anyone says that the one, true God, our creator and lord, cannot be known with certainty from the things that have been made, by the natural light of human reason: let him be anathema.

So, if one denies that God cannot be known through “the natural light of human reason” “with certainty from the things that have been made,” then that person is “anathema.”

But consider the limited proposition involved in this canon. The canon does not say how it is that a person has to know God through the natural light of human reason. It offers no specific proof as the way that the person must reason from “the things that have been made” to God. Moreover, it doesn’t even require that any person be able to say that they have done that reasoning himself. All the canon demands is that the faithful not deny that God can be known from “the things that have been made” through the light of natural human reason.

Hence, my point was that all a faithful Catholic had to do to remain faithful was to affirm that it could be done, by someone else, somewhere else, at some other time.

There is ambiguity in the canon. For example, does the canon say that we must affirm that knowledge of God through reason is something that has already happened?

Or can we say that sometime in the future, it will happen?

I think the former is a more proper understanding of the canon. The Catholic Encyclopedia offers this interpretation of the canon:

It will be observed that neither the Scriptural texts we have quoted nor the conciliar decrees say that God's existence can be proved or demonstrated; they merely affirm that it can be known with certainty. Now one may, if one wishes, insist on the distinction between what is knowable and what is demonstrable, but in the present connection this distinction has little real import. It has never been claimed that God's existence can be proved mathematically, as a proposition in geometry is proved, and most Theists reject every form of the ontological or deductive proof. But if the term proof or demonstration may be, as it often is, applied to a posteriori or inductive inference, by means of which knowledge that is not innate or intuitive is acquired by the exercise of reason, then it cannot fairly be denied that Catholic teaching virtually asserts that God's existence can be proved. Certain knowledge of God is declared to be attainable "by the light of reason", i.e. of the reasoning faculty as such from or through "the things that are made"; and this clearly implies an inferential process such as in other connections men do not hesitate to call proof.

I take it that this is in line with Literatus' and my earlier position that our reason can impel us reasonably to accept God based on the “weight of the evidence,” i.e., as a matter of probabilities. After all, that kind of reasoning – and proof – is what we do every day, and we accept the conclusions of reasoning as “proof” with “certainty” on a host of subjects, even though we lack mathematical or ontological certainty.

The canon also does not require any one of us to affirm that we have that “certainty” of God from “the things that God has made” by an exercise of reason. Frankly, that kind of individual requirement would be inconsistent with the traditions of Catholicism, which have always permitted a latent or incipient faith. As evidence in favor of my historical assertion, let me offer St. Thomas in ST Q. 2. 2:

Objection 1. It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (Hebrews 11:1). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists.

And:

Reply to Objection 1. The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.

Hence, my sort of tongue and cheek assertion that we can be fideistic about reason.
Obviously, that wasn’t St. Thomas’ point; rather, it was a recognition that we can believe a lot of things that we don’t personally understand. I believe in computers, for example, but I have no idea about how they work. I rather doubt that I would ever be able to understand how they work, but I’m certain that there are people who do understand. I take their explanations on faith. In that sense, I am a fideist about technology, but the position I am taking is not fideistic.

Of course, this kind of thinking runs counter to the modern mantra that we should not believe in things for which we do not ourselves possess evidence – a mantra that is applied only to orthodox religious belief, it seems, and not to things like the benevolence of government or global warming or the inner mechanics of the internet.

Also, note that St. Thomas does not speak about the existence of God as being an article of faith. He views that issue as a “preamble to faith” that is susceptible to human reason. What he would describe as being a matter of pure faith are those things which we cannot see in the “things that He has made,” such as the doctrine of the Trinity.

The difference between God’s existence and the Trinity has a lot to do with the ability to see things. St. Paul did say that faith was the “evidence of things not seen” but we see the world, which is a handiwork of God. Since God leaves traces of Himself in His creation, and because there is a connection between God and His creation, it is possible to compare God and creation and to speak of God through analogies with his creation. The things of the world are not “things not seen.”

On the other hand, the inner relationships of God are not seen by us, except through revelation. When God creates, He acts as one being rather than individually through His persons. So, we can’t point to this bit of creation and say that this is a sign of the Son, etc.

B. Why do we believe in the ability of human reason to know God?

The simple answer – to quote Tevye - is “Tradition!”

I mentioned Robert Louis Wilkens’ point that one of the traits of Christianity has been its “unapologetic intellectualism.” Wilkens cites 1 Peter (be ready to give a “reason for the hope that is within you”) as the basis for this tradition.
The tradition goes back before that, however. Vatican 1 cited two texts in support of the canon I quoted earlier – Romans 1 and Wisdom 13.

In Romans, Paul writes:

Romans 1
19 For what can be known about God is evident to them, because God made it evident to them.
20 Ever since the creation of the world, his invisible attributes of eternal power and divinity have been able to be understood and perceived in what he has made. As a result, they have no excuse;
21 for although they knew God they did not accord him glory as God or give him thanks. Instead, they became vain in their reasoning, and their senseless minds were darkened.
22 While claiming to be wise, they became fools…

The Vatican 1 Council (1870) took this as support for the proposition that God can be known to thinking men “in what he has made.”

Wisdom 13 says this:

1 For all men were by nature foolish who were in ignorance of God, and who from the good things seen did not succeed in knowing him who is, and from studying the works did not discern the artisan;
2 But either fire, or wind, or the swift air, or the circuit of the stars, or the mighty water, or the luminaries of heaven, the governors of the world, they considered gods.
3 Now if out of joy in their beauty they thought them gods, let them know how far more excellent is the Lord than these; for the original source of beauty fashioned them.
4 Or if they were struck by their might and energy, let them from these things realize how much more powerful is he who made them.
5 For from the greatness and the beauty of created things their original author, by analogy, is seen.
6 But yet, for these the blame is less; For they indeed have gone astray perhaps, though they seek God and wish to find him.
7 For they search busily among his works, but are distracted by what they see, because the things seen are fair.
8 But again, not even these are pardonable.
9 For if they so far succeeded in knowledge that they could speculate about the world, how did they not more quickly find its LORD?

The Catholic Encyclopedia explains this passage:

Here it is clearly taught
- that the phenomenal or contingent world -- the things that are seen -- requires a cause distinct from and greater than itself or any of its elements;
- that this cause who is God is not unknowable, but is known with certainty not only to exist but to possess in Himself, in a higher degree, whatever beauty, strength, or other perfections are realized in His works,
- that this conclusion is attainable by the right exercise of human reason, without reference to supernatural revelation, and that philosophers, therefore, who are able to interpret the world philosophically, are inexcusable for their ignorance of the true God, their failure, it is implied, being due rather to lack of good will than to the incapacity of the human mind.

My take on where the “authority” for asserting that man can know God through natural reason is that there has always been a tradition that such a thing is true. (See also, Proverbs (“The fool in his heart has said that there is no God.”) We can certainly point to bible passages as evidence of this tradition, but those passages are simply part of the larger tradition passed on “orally” and as the background against which the particular bible passages were written and are understood. So, Catholics don’t say that man can understand God through the natural light of human reason because of “bible authority,” but we don’t say it in the absence of “bible” authority either. We say it because that has been part of the tradition from the beginning.

I think that offers some understanding of how the Church got to that particular canon. There is also the further tradition of ancient and medieval Christian philosophers using philosophy to reason about philosophical truths. Most of that was offered in the early portions of Prof. Carey’s lecture series.

Here’s another good one.

May Book: Guide to Thomas Aquinas

The book selection for May '09 is Josef Pieper's Guide to Thomas Aquinas.

Amazon Link: http://www.amazon.com/Guide-Thomas-Aquinas-Josef-Pieper/dp/0898703190/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1240854413&sr=8-1

Paradise Lost: Discussion 4/25/09

Some of the topics discussed at the meeting on April 25 (participants may wish to expand and correct the following):

Does Milton display heresy in PL?

What's up with Chaos?

Chaos, his companions, and his throne are outside heaven, hell, and earth. (Satan discovers them en route from Hell to earth.) Were they created? How do they relate to God, demons, man?


Was Milton "of the Devil's Party"?

Yes: Milton was seduced by Satan. He draws Satan so well, having him drive the action, giving him the best lines ("better to reign in hell than serve in heaven," "evil be though my good"), that he's the most dramatically appealing character.

No: Milton was not seduced by Satan. We see through the speeches (e.g., Abdiel and God) and through the events described (Satan loses in the end: though he sabotages mankind by instigating the fall, God's grace overcomes in the end), it's clear that Milton knows that Satan's arguments are self-delusions and Satan's power is ineffective. Milton was giving Satan every benefit dramatically, but still shows that he's a failure. It would be Adam, Christ, and/or God who would be the heroes in Milton's view.