Natural Law: Is Teleology Inherently Arbitrary?

Simplicimus writes to Teleologus:

I share your desire for philosophy to embrace purposeful meaning of life, and often rebel against trends in modern thought.

However, isn't the loss of the idea of formal and final causes (which I think are very close, if not identical, at bottom) due to a modern recognition of arbitrariness?

At any rate, I don't see how one gets to an analysis of formal and final causes that is neither

(1) fundamentally arbitrary, nor

(2) reliant on some form of divine revelation. (We've had a similar discussion regarding ethics.)


How can one say non-arbitrarily that a dog is (or is not) for any of the following purposes?

• Companionship
• Herding sheep
• The meat dish at supper
• Medical research
• Something that we probably wouldn't think of in a thousand years

Do you see a way to square that circle?

Teleologus responds to Simplicimus:

In Aristotle, the purpose of an organism or object is found non-arbitrarily in what it is uniquely suited to do. When I teach this stuff in class, I start taking things from my briefcase and asking questions like, "Could this cell phone serve as a paperweight? It can? Well, then, is that it's purpose? No? Why not? Oh! Because it is much better used for something else, right? Could these scissors be used as a door stop? Etc."

Now what is a human being uniquely suited to do? Go swimming? Sleep in the sun? Copulate? We can do those things, but those activities are not uniquely human activities. Aristotle's answer, in a word, is think. So the purpose of human life is to think (rationally, as only humans can do, or as humans can do better than other animals that can also think). The next question is What makes something excellent? Short answer: that if fulfills its purpose well. So what makes a human an excellent human? To think well.

Thomas Aquinas gets hold of this stuff and modifies the purpose of human life to be to know and worship God, because that is what Thomas understands humans to be uniquely suited to do. What, then, is an excellent human being? One who knows and worships God well.

All this to say that there is at least a theory as to how final cause is non-arbitrary. I see the modern rejection of final cause to be based on empiricism, more so than on a recognition of arbitrariness. Final causes are not sense-perceptible in the way that material and efficient causes are. (Of course Hume famously argued that efficient causes aren't sense-perceptible either!)

Modernism and science get lots of credit from me for reducing human suffering (antibiotics! cancer surgery!) but often at the cost of removing the possibility of finding meaning in the suffering (and death) that remains part of human life.

Academicius also responds to Simplicimus:

I think that Aristotelian essentialism is a tricky notion. The reason it's tricky is because it is the concept of necessity-within-contingency. What I'm calling contingency is what you, Russ, are calling arbitrary. I know "arbitrary" and "contingent" don't have the same meaning, but in this context their meanings are similar enough that Aristotle's point goes through when you substitute "arbitrary" for "contingent." The existence of any particular thing or kind of thing is arbitrary in the sense that it it did not have to exist. This is true whether you think God created the universe or the universe as we know it evolved from some basic material constituents. God's good pleasure is not wholly arbitrary (because his will is entirely good), but there was no necessity that he should create anything. But to exist at all, at least in the material world or the world of the senses, is to exist as a kind of thing (a member of a species, if you will)--this basic metaphysical principle is implicit throughout Aristotle. So while the the existence of any particular tiger (for instance) is arbitrary in the sense that that tiger would not exist without its two particular parents (a condition which "contingent" captures better than "arbitrary"), it is necessary for it to be a tiger for it to exist at all, and that means that it is necessary for it to have the characteristics which make tigers tigers. So its "proper functioning" as a tiger is so far from being arbitrary that it could not exist at all if it did not function properly (or strive, even though unconsciously, to function properly) according to the tiger nature which determines it in existence. Its nature includes its formal cause and final cause, and its functioning in accordance with its nature is necessary in the essentialist sense of necessity--the strong metaphysical sense which makes it necessary for it to pursue the ends determined by its nature if it is to exist at all. Of course there can be arguments about what a tiger's nature or a human's nature is. But I think it's pretty implausible to argue that no ends belong to human beings just because they are human beings. For instance, taking nutrition is not arbitrarily assigned to our proper functioning. I think you can make a plausible argument that respecting the moral law is just as much a part of our proper functioning as taking nutrition, and even that loving God with a full heart and mind is just as much a part of our proper functioning, as that proper functioning is determined by our rational nature.

Simplicimus responds to Teleologus and Academicius:

I'm pretty sure that I'm talking about an arbitrariness problem, not contingency as Acad describes it. However, we'll know better as we go along.

In the course of a separate discussion on natural law and reproduction, Academicius wrote:

If belief in God is not already in place, you can make the same argument from reproduction by itself as a purpose of nature (a purpose recognized by Darwinists as well). The orientation to reproduction must be part of the human good because it is part of human nature, the human good as a rational good requires rational formation, which places constraints on the good of reproduction and requires its conscious direction toward the rational good, whatever that may be besides the orientation to reproduction. A couple not oriented by nature to reproduction because they are the same sex does not meet the essential first condition which orders themselves and their children or charges to the good of rational nature, whose pursuit under those conditions is therefore a priori disordered.

Simplicimus responded to Teleologus and Academicius:

Evidently, I'm enough of a modern that I don't even think I understand what Academicius means by the following: "you can make the same argument from reproduction by itself as a purpose of nature (a purpose recognized by Darwinists as well). The orientation to reproduction must be part of the human good because it is part of human nature..."

Nobody I know would argue that reproduction is not "a purpose of human nature" (to use your phrase: I'm still concerned that the term "purpose" (like "fideist") obscures more than it enlightens), or that reproduction is categorically not "part of the human good". Many of us would, of course, argue that, in certain circumstances, reproduction is not as good as birth control. While I respect the fact that Catholics are constrained by a doctrinal position on that point, I would defy anyone to show from natural law principles alone (independent of theology) that sex for reasons other than procreation is an offense against nature.

So, while I would never dispute that reproduction is a part of the sex experience, I do insist that it is not the totality, nor anywhere near the totality. As Erasmus noted ..., enjoyment also is a significant part, and bonding within the couple is a very significant part. There no doubt are other benefits that I'll think of later.

So, once again we encounter some of those arbitrariness objections to teleology:

1. who's place is it to say that reproduction is more important than pleasure, bonding, or other benefits, and
   
2. what proof is there that there is any definable moral "purpose" to an activity? (On that second question, we'd probably be much clearer by talking about costs and benefits rather than purposes.)

In order to make the teleological/natural law argument that I understand you both (and Scholasticus) to be making, you'd have to show that reproduction is of so much a higher order than those other benefits that it allows you to say that sexual conduct purely for pleasure, bonding, etc., is "disordered" -- or, as Scholasticus says, "dehumanizing." I don't see how you'll ever, in an objective sense, get to such a privileged status for reproduction. (Remember, I'm talking teleology and natural law here, not theology: one can do about just anything with claims to revelation.)

To me, a fundamental problem with teleology is the attempt to designate a primary purpose for things: many things have multiple purposes, and it's inherently subjective to say which is "primary". As I see it, when you argue that onanism is an offense against nature because that's not what the plumbing is "for," you also should say that the mouth is for eating, so it violates nature to use it for speaking, singing, whistling, kissing, blowing bubbles, or smiling.