Wednesday, June 17, 2009

A few more natural-law concepts

Dionysus writes:

None of the possible "purposes" of a dog listed by Simplicicus in his question about the arbitrariness of the concept of purpose, goal, end, or any other translation of the Greek
telos is a candidate for an essential end of a dog. All the possible ends which are cited by Simplicicus are "accidental" ends of dogs based on their usefulness to the human species. The essential ends and "proper functioning" of a dog are determined by its form (or nature or internal structure) which distinguishes it from individuals of other species. Thus it is an end determined by dog nature that dogs are pack animals, or that they care for their young. It is an end not determined by dog nature that some dogs walk on their hind legs some of the time. But whether even this last end is arbitrary is open to question. I would like to suggest that the term "arbitrary" cannot have any place in discussions of ends or purposes. The concept of an end is inherently rational. This seems to be an axiom you are unwilling to accept, Simplicicus. Yet all the ends we can conceive are either set by nature, which makes them natural and therefore rational in the sense that laws of nature (where law includes the concept of rationality) must be followed by individual members of species if those individuals are to function properly (or flourish or achieve eudaimonia); or they are set by human beings, which makes them rational in the sense that the human being set the end for a reason. (Part of the view I am advocating here is that the term "good reason" is a redundancy, while the term "bad reason" is either figurative or contradictory. Thus the only ends which should be considered arbitrary are ends which go against the good as it is determined by the essential properties of species. This would mean that it is not an arbitrary end of human beings to breed dogs to herd sheep, nor is it an arbitrary end of dogs to herd sheep under the command of human beings: both of these ends and activities conform to the natures of both species.) If you wish to deny the claims of natural law, you must begin by defending the claim that we can interpret the natural world wholly without reference to ends. Whatever their protestations to the contrary, even the Darwinists cannot do this since they accept the axiom that life itself (or biological existence itself) seeks its own continuation, which is certainly the concept of an end.

Simplicimus replies:

Oh, Dionysus, you party animal, you!

Once again, I may not have been clear in discussing arbitrariness. (I may need the nine lives of a cat to reach clarity, while here we are stuck with dogs!)

On arbitrariness of purposes: I do not say that purposes are arbitrary, although anyone who's watched an 11-year-old boy carving wood is likely to conclude that arbitrary purposes are possible.

Rather, I am saying that it is arbitrary for a teleologist to assign "the essential purpose" of a thing or organism. Every thing and every organism has many attributes, and may have many purposes.

It is not that purposes are arbitrary (if I make a shovel, I've made it for a purpose), it's the designation by the teleologist (a third party) of an essential purpose that is arbitrary. Who are you (or I, or or Aristotle, or even the SPCA) to say what is the "essential purpose"?

Now, if all that you mean by "essential purpose" is that an organism is to be what it is, as described by its attributes, then that that is either a meaningless or a loaded use of the word "purpose".

To suggest that an organism is "meant" by nature to be what it is has no meaning at all, in which case
you could better avoid the term "purpose" entirely and simply note that the creature has certain attributes.

On the other hand, if you mean by "essential purpose" that there was a creator whose will can be discerned from the attributes that he gave the creature, then that is a loaded use of the term purpose, and we'd need to deal with proof of the creator, as well as divination of his will.


And it still would be a conclusion that requires defense to go on from the established fact of a creator, to argue that the attributes given by the creator imply a purpose. Perhaps, like the divine clockmaker so popular in the 18th century, he just set the machinery in motion, with no purpose other than to sit back and watch the show. Or, arguably, he might (like the auto industry) have intentionally built the system to move toward obsolescence and decay, rather than to strive toward maximization of form.

I'm not saying that there cannot be a purpose. I'm saying that whatever "purpose" we may want to propose requires more than just the simple fact of attributes.

That's where the wheels come off the logical cart for teleology: in the end, it seems to me, the teleological discussion of "essential purpose" necessarily collapses into a mere description of attributes. As noted above, that's an extremely weak (or misleading) use of the term "purpose"; and it's an unsatisfactory one, since what the teleologist really wants to do is to go on from those attributes to make moral judgments about what that creature should (or should not) do.

On the purpose of "dogness":

Would you say that variations between species of dog-like creatures (dog, fox, wolf) lead to creatures having different essential purposes? What about intra-species variations, as among breeds of dogs (dachshund, doberman)? And what is the teleological conclusion from differences among individuals within a breed or species?

On "Purpose" in Darwinism: Darwinism (and I'll use it here interchangeably with evolutionary theory, though I'm sure that a specialist in the field would wince) offers two good examples of the problem of inferring a "purpose" from attributes.

First, I acknowledge Darwinism does observe that genes are chemically programmed to reproduce themselves, leading to behaviors in the organisms that (in general) promote that reproduction. That's an observation of fact, not a moral value or judgment.
It's simply an observation of how genetic material has structured itself (or been structured -- we haven't got into that discussion). While I obviously cannot prove this, I very much doubt that most careful Darwinist scientists would use the word "purpose" in their description of that fact, if they thought it was going to be used to imply moral judgments.

Obviously, many Darwinists do in fact purport to make value/moral judgments (e.g., it's wrong to kill whales or other endangered species) -- they're only human (the Darwinists, not the whales). But they're not being consistent, in that they only complain about humans, not other organisms, doing the killing. Nature involves inter-species rivalries, even unto death. Indeed, evolution requires it.

Also, many of the value judgments that they make ("It's wrong to wear fur.") are based on values entirely outside of Darwinism. You need something more than the Darwinist observation that genes work to pass on their genetic information in order to be able to argue that there is a "purpose" to an organism that would allow you to make moral judgments.

Second, Darwinism famously entails evolution. By your standard, it appears that natural evolution would be an offense against nature, because an organism, instead of realizing its "purpose" of perfecting what it "is" instead is changing to become something new.

And I got through all that without a single pun about "dogma". There really is order in the universe!

Regards,
Simplicimus

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